Thursday, October 4, 2012
Court of Appeals, in rare move, reverses Ohio Department of Education on finding educator had committed "conduct unbecoming" the teaching profession
In a rare move, the 10th District Court of Appeals has reversed a finding that an educator committed conduct unbecoming the teaching profession. In that case, a 25 year teaching veteran restrained a student who was out of control. As a result of the restraint, the student ended up with scratches and red marks on his lower back and buttocks. The teacher did not have first aid administered immediately, but allowed the child to proceed home on a school bus, with directions to have the child's mother call the teacher. Once home, the child's mother gave him a bath and applied Neosporin. The teacher did not immediately fill out the paperwork reporting her encounter with the student and his minor injuries. Though she began a report, she was interrupted by teaching preparation. As a result of this, and the fact that her principal was not in school, her report of the incident was was not submitted until the next Monday. On these facts, ODE initiated charges, claiming that the teacher's actions amounted to 'conduct unbecoming' the teaching profession. After a hearing, the ODE found that the teacher had engaged in conduct unbecoming the teaching profession and that her license should be permanently revoked. That finding was upheld by a court of common pleas judge. However, the 10th District reversed the decision on appeal and remanded the case for further proceedings at the Ohio Department of Education. In reaching its decision, the court noted that, "[t]eachers are called upon to make professional judgments every day and the reasonable exercise of such professional judgment cannot constitute a violation of R.C. 3319.31(B) as conduct unbecoming a classroom teacher." Sending the case back to ODE, the agency must now answer the question: "whether a teacher who accidentally inflicts scratches on an out-of-control preschool student deserves disciplinary action from ODE and, if disciplinary action is warranted, what discipline is appropriate?" I would hope for the sake of Ohio's educators that the answer to the first question is no, and that the second question then becomes moot.
Monday, September 10, 2012
Sixth Circuit adopts two year statute of limitations for disability discrimination cases in Ohio
In a case brought against Miami (Ohio) University, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has now clarified that claims brought against universities are subject to a two-year statute of limitations in Ohio. Moreover, cases brought by students or former students against their universities based on either Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act or the Americans with Disabilities Act must be filed within two years, or they will be time-barred. The case is McCormick v. Miami University.
Tuesday, July 10, 2012
Federal Court agrees that doctoral student was given due process
The 6th Circuit Court of Appeals, this week, upheld the decision of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, which granted summary judgment to Wayne State University and Wayne State officials. In that case, a doctoral student sued school officials after having her doctoral degree revoked. The university accused the student of plagarizing portions of her doctoral thesis. The student had argued, among other things, that school officials have violated the 14th Amendment's due process clause by (1) not providing her sufficient notice that her degree could be revoked or (2) that the procedures utilized by the University were inadequate. Both the district court and the court of appeals disagreed with the student.
Thursday, July 5, 2012
Youngstown appeals court sides with private school in bullying, breach of contract case
The Seventh District Court of Appeals of Ohio has affirmed a trial court decision on summary motion in a case brought by a former student against a Catholic school. In that case, a student at a private school alleged that she was being bullied and harassed for two school years as a member of the varsity tennis team. As a result of the allegations, the parents withdrew the student from the private school. Subsequently, the parents filed a complaint asserting causes of action causes of for breach of contract, implied duty of good faith and fair dealings, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent supervision, and civil conspiracy. Furthermore, the complaint alleged that the student was intimidated, harassed, isolated, treated unfairly and bullied by the Girls Tennis Team, the Coach Ketchem and the administration of the private high school. They contended that the high school handbook and policies, which allegedly set forth a no harassment/bullying policy, created a contract between the high school and the student. The plaintiffs asserted that the high school breached that contract by allowing the student to be harassed and bullied. The trial court, in adopting the decision of the magistrate below, found that the school did not engage in any type of conduct that could be considered a breach of contract. Specifically, the conduct complained of did not support the claims of harassment and/or intimidation as alleged by the plaintiffs and that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the existence of a fiduciary relationship between the student and the school. As to the negligence, negligent supervision, emotional distress and civil conspiracy claims, the magistrate held that even when construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the plaintiffs, the record was devoid of evidence which could cause a reasonable person to believe that the school was negligent in their conduct concerning the student and her parents. The parents timely appealed the decision. The court of appeals affirmed. Notabely, the appeals court starts off by recognizing that some Ohio courts have found that a private school handbook may create a contract between the student and the private school. However, the appeals court declined to answer whether or not this particular handbook constituted a contract.
Tuesday, June 5, 2012
Court of Appeals reverses student's expulsion due to school board error
The Fourth District Court of Appeals this week has reversed a school board's decision to expel a student because the school board failed hold a hearing within the time limits contained in R.C. 3313.66(B)(6), among other reasons. In November 2009, a student allegedly attacked another student. The Superintendent notified the student that she may be expelled and subsequently held a hearing at the student's request, but did so outside the time frame provided in the Ohio Revised Code. Nonetheless, the Superintendent and School Board decided to expel the student. Because the hearing in front of the Superintendent took place outside the statutory time frame, and for other reasons, the trial court reversed the decision of the school board and ruled that the student must be reinstated. The appeals court upheld the decision of the trial court. This case highlights the importance that parents and students be cognizant about both procedural and substantive rights that they have when dealing with a public school disciplinary issue, and would be well advised to seek counsel as soon as practical.
Wednesday, May 23, 2012
6th Circuit sides with parents in IEP dispute
The United States Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit, which covers Ohio, has reversed the decision of a U.S. District Court in Kentucky to dismiss a parents' claims under IDEA and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. In that case, the parents filed a due process complaint alleging, among other things, that their son's IEP, implemented in 2004, was inadequate because he was not receiving certain services. A hearing was held and the hearing officer agreed with the school district in some respects, but found that the 2004 IEP was, as the parents suggested, inadequate. The hearing officer also found that the school district should have to reimburse the parents for certain tutoring expenses incurred as a result of the state's failure to provide the student a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE). The school appealed the decision to Kentucky's Exceptional Children Appeals' Board (ECAB) that the district had not been given proper notice that the complaint included a charge that the child was not receiving proper services under the 2004 IEP. The ECAB agreed, and reversed the hearing officer. The parents then filed a lawsuit, requesting the hearing officer's decision stand, and also alleging that the school district had violated the child's rights under 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The district court found in favor of the parents, reversing the ECAB regarding the notice issue, but dismissed the 504 claim. Both parties appealed. Finding that the school district did have proper notice, the 6th Circuit affirmed the district court's opinion as to that count. However, the appeals court found that the district court committed error with respect to dismissing the rest of the IEP and 504 claims and sent the case back to the district court for further proceedings. It is important to note, as the appeals court did here, that the complaint was filed when the child was in 6th grade. He is now getting ready to graduate high school.
Wednesday, April 4, 2012
Administrators must be given notice, meeting, Supreme Court rules
The Supreme Court of Ohio ruled today, in a 7-0 opinion, that the failure of a School Board to grant the request of a grade school principal for a meeting with the board prior to the board’s vote not to renew her contract was a violation of state law that invalidates the board’s vote not to renew the principal’s contract and requires her reemployment.
In that case, an elementary school principal entered into an administrative contract with the School District to serve as a principal for the 2006-2007 and 2007-2008 school years. In May 2007, during her first year as principal, she was placed on paid administrative leave for the remaining term of her contract based on school employees’ allegations that she had tampered with Ohio Achievement Test answer sheets that had been completed by students at the school. In June or July 2007, the principal was orally advised by an assistant district superintendent that her contract would not be renewed when it expired in the summer of 2008. At the time of that notification, the principal orally informed the assistant superintendent that she wanted to meet with the district school board prior to any final board action on the nonrenewal of her contract.
Despite the principal's request, at a regularly scheduled school board meeting on March 17, 2008, without advance notice to the principal that her contact would be considered at that meeting and without a prior meeting with her to discuss its reasons for nonrenewal, the board voted not to renew her contract.
Subsequently, the Ohio Department of Education determined that there was no evidence that any tests had been altered or that the principal altered any tests.
The principal then filed a lawsuit, arguing R.C. 3319.02(D)(4), requires that, before a school board takes action to renew or non-renew the contract of a public school administrator, if the administrator requests a meeting with the board, the board “shall grant a meeting in executive session,” at which the board “shall discuss its reasons for considering renewal or nonrenewal of the contract.” R.C. 3319.02(D)(5) provides that if a school board “fails to provide at the request of the employee a meeting as prescribed in division D(4) of this section, the employee automatically shall be reemployed ...”
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed both the trial court and the court of appeals.
In that case, an elementary school principal entered into an administrative contract with the School District to serve as a principal for the 2006-2007 and 2007-2008 school years. In May 2007, during her first year as principal, she was placed on paid administrative leave for the remaining term of her contract based on school employees’ allegations that she had tampered with Ohio Achievement Test answer sheets that had been completed by students at the school. In June or July 2007, the principal was orally advised by an assistant district superintendent that her contract would not be renewed when it expired in the summer of 2008. At the time of that notification, the principal orally informed the assistant superintendent that she wanted to meet with the district school board prior to any final board action on the nonrenewal of her contract.
Despite the principal's request, at a regularly scheduled school board meeting on March 17, 2008, without advance notice to the principal that her contact would be considered at that meeting and without a prior meeting with her to discuss its reasons for nonrenewal, the board voted not to renew her contract.
Subsequently, the Ohio Department of Education determined that there was no evidence that any tests had been altered or that the principal altered any tests.
The principal then filed a lawsuit, arguing R.C. 3319.02(D)(4), requires that, before a school board takes action to renew or non-renew the contract of a public school administrator, if the administrator requests a meeting with the board, the board “shall grant a meeting in executive session,” at which the board “shall discuss its reasons for considering renewal or nonrenewal of the contract.” R.C. 3319.02(D)(5) provides that if a school board “fails to provide at the request of the employee a meeting as prescribed in division D(4) of this section, the employee automatically shall be reemployed ...”
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed both the trial court and the court of appeals.
Thursday, February 16, 2012
Supreme Court holds that public employees may sue employers for intentional torts
The Supreme Court of Ohio held today that when an employee of a political subdivision brings a civil lawsuit against the subdivision alleging an intentional tort, such as defamation, assault, battery, or other delibertte act, that lawsuit may proceed, and an employer may be liable for such. Further, the court's decision finds that an employee’s suit “arises out of the employment relationship” if there is a causal connection or relationship between the claims raised by the employee and the employment relationship.
The decision helps clarify the liablity of, among others, school districts for suits brought against them by employees.
The decision helps clarify the liablity of, among others, school districts for suits brought against them by employees.
Wednesday, February 1, 2012
Sixth Circuit reinstates graduate student's lawsuit based on student's refusal to counsel gay men and women on their same sex relationships
The U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has reinstated the lawsuit of a graduate student at Eastern Michigan University (EMU) that had been dismissed by the District Court over her disagreement over counseling gay clients.
In that case, Eastern Michigan University prohibited its counseling students from discriminating against others based on sexual orientation and taught students to affirm a client’s values during counseling sessions. A graduate student in school counseling had consistently clashed with her professors regarding her purportedly held Christian beliefs that prohibited her from affirming same sex relationships (and heterosexual conduct like extra-marital relationships). Despite this ongoing dispute, the graduate student did well in the program and continued towards her degree.
Towards the end of her program, the student, who had a 3.91 GPA, was asked to counsel a gay client. The graduate student asked that the gay client be referred to another counselor based on her beliefs. The client was referred to another counselor and disciplinary action was taken against the graduate student. She was, in fact, dismissed from the program.
The graduate student subsequently filed a lawsuit against the university, claiming an infringement of her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The District Court dismissed the case on summary judgment. The graduate student appealed.
While recognizing that universities have discretion in curriculum choices, the Sixth Circuit determined that a reasonable jury could have found, when the facts were viewed most favorably towards the graduate student, that it was error for the university to have a no referral policy, as the same could have violated the graduate student's constitutional rights.
This does not mean that the graduate student wins the case. Rather, it just means that the matter can proceed to a jury trial.
In that case, Eastern Michigan University prohibited its counseling students from discriminating against others based on sexual orientation and taught students to affirm a client’s values during counseling sessions. A graduate student in school counseling had consistently clashed with her professors regarding her purportedly held Christian beliefs that prohibited her from affirming same sex relationships (and heterosexual conduct like extra-marital relationships). Despite this ongoing dispute, the graduate student did well in the program and continued towards her degree.
Towards the end of her program, the student, who had a 3.91 GPA, was asked to counsel a gay client. The graduate student asked that the gay client be referred to another counselor based on her beliefs. The client was referred to another counselor and disciplinary action was taken against the graduate student. She was, in fact, dismissed from the program.
The graduate student subsequently filed a lawsuit against the university, claiming an infringement of her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The District Court dismissed the case on summary judgment. The graduate student appealed.
While recognizing that universities have discretion in curriculum choices, the Sixth Circuit determined that a reasonable jury could have found, when the facts were viewed most favorably towards the graduate student, that it was error for the university to have a no referral policy, as the same could have violated the graduate student's constitutional rights.
This does not mean that the graduate student wins the case. Rather, it just means that the matter can proceed to a jury trial.
Thursday, December 1, 2011
Law firm invoices, other documents, protected by attorney-client privilege, Supreme Court rules
The Supreme Court of Ohio refused to grant a writ of mandamus, this week, in a public records request case that pitted a school district versus a parent. In that case, the parent had sought access to (1)itemized invoices of law firms providing services to the district in matters pertaining to the parent and her children and (2) communications from the school district’s insurance carrier identifying attorney Janet Cooper as the district’s legal representative and describing the liability and exposure of the district and insurance company related to a case filed against the district by the parent on behalf of one of her children.
The school district provided the parent with summaries of the
invoices noting the attorney’s name, the invoice total, and the matter involved.
The district did not, however, provide the parent with the requested itemized
invoices, because they contained what it considered to be confidential
information, stating, that the itemized monthly statements contain descriptions of
the work performed by the attorneys of Bricker and Eckler, L.L.P. and include:
statements regarding their communications to each other and insurance counsel; the areas and issues the attorneys researched; and the legal issues
upon which they focused their attention.
After protracted requests and negotiations, the parent filed a request with the Supreme Court that the school district be ordered to turn over the records. Ultimately, the Supreme Court determined that the records requested were confidential and privileged, due to attorney-client privilege between the district and its counsel.
The school district provided the parent with summaries of the
invoices noting the attorney’s name, the invoice total, and the matter involved.
The district did not, however, provide the parent with the requested itemized
invoices, because they contained what it considered to be confidential
information, stating, that the itemized monthly statements contain descriptions of
the work performed by the attorneys of Bricker and Eckler, L.L.P. and include:
statements regarding their communications to each other and insurance counsel; the areas and issues the attorneys researched; and the legal issues
upon which they focused their attention.
After protracted requests and negotiations, the parent filed a request with the Supreme Court that the school district be ordered to turn over the records. Ultimately, the Supreme Court determined that the records requested were confidential and privileged, due to attorney-client privilege between the district and its counsel.
Monday, October 31, 2011
Exception does not apply; Sixth Circuit affirms dismissal of parents' IDEA Complaint
The 6th Circuit Court of Appeals this morning upheld a district court's dismissal of a lawsuit brought pursuant to IDEA because the parents refused to exhaust their administrative remedies.
In that case, the student had been diagnosed with Asperger’s Disorder,
Attention Deficit Hyper Activity Disorder, Anxiety Disorder, and Major Depressive Disorder. During the second half of the 2008-09 school year the student's performance began to decline and he developed anger issues and demonstrated explosive behavior.
As a result of these changes, the parents requested that a Multifactored Evaluation (MFE) be performed. The school district initially refused, and ultimately concluded that the child did not meet the definition of disabled under IDEA and was therefore not entitled to an Individualized Education Plan (IEP). After additional information was submitted to the school district, and additional negotiations took place, the parents filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio alleging violations of, inter alia, the Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA). The district court then put on an agreed order that the school district would perform an MFE, which the district subsequently conducted.
The school district then filed a motion to dismiss the action, alleging the parents had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. Further, the parents filed a motion for attorney fees, alleging that they were the prevailing party because the school district agreed to perform an MFE.
Generally, before filing a lawsuit under IDEA, parents are required to exhaust state administrative remedies. This requirement does have an exception when it would be futile or inadequate to protect a plaintiff's rights.
Here, the Court found that the exception did not apply and that the trial court properly dismissed the complaint because the parents had not filed a request for an administrative hearing.
In that case, the student had been diagnosed with Asperger’s Disorder,
Attention Deficit Hyper Activity Disorder, Anxiety Disorder, and Major Depressive Disorder. During the second half of the 2008-09 school year the student's performance began to decline and he developed anger issues and demonstrated explosive behavior.
As a result of these changes, the parents requested that a Multifactored Evaluation (MFE) be performed. The school district initially refused, and ultimately concluded that the child did not meet the definition of disabled under IDEA and was therefore not entitled to an Individualized Education Plan (IEP). After additional information was submitted to the school district, and additional negotiations took place, the parents filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio alleging violations of, inter alia, the Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA). The district court then put on an agreed order that the school district would perform an MFE, which the district subsequently conducted.
The school district then filed a motion to dismiss the action, alleging the parents had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. Further, the parents filed a motion for attorney fees, alleging that they were the prevailing party because the school district agreed to perform an MFE.
Generally, before filing a lawsuit under IDEA, parents are required to exhaust state administrative remedies. This requirement does have an exception when it would be futile or inadequate to protect a plaintiff's rights.
Here, the Court found that the exception did not apply and that the trial court properly dismissed the complaint because the parents had not filed a request for an administrative hearing.
Wednesday, September 21, 2011
Teacher's appeal of non-renewal must be filed with Board of Education, Court rules
Earlier this month, the Third District Court of Appeals of Ohio agreed with a trial court that dismissed a teacher's complaint after he was non-renewed by his school district. The reason was because the teacher failed to initially file a notice of appeal with the board of education, and instead, went straight to court.
In that case, the teacher was informed that his contract was to have been non-renewed after approximately a decade of service. The teacher requested a hearing regarding the non-renewal, which was subsequently granted by the Board of Education. Thereafter, the Board of Education affirmed its decision to non-renew his contract. Twenty eight days later, the teacher filed a complaint in the Marion County Court of Common Pleas.
The school district responded by filing a motion to dismiss the complaint, which was granted by the court. The school district argued, and the court agreed, that before the complaint was filed, the teacher should have filed a notice of appeal with the Board of Education within 30 days of the decision of the Board not to renew the contract.
The appellate court agreed that the teacher has 30 days to file his appeal, and that appeal must first be filed with the Board of Education.
In that case, the teacher was informed that his contract was to have been non-renewed after approximately a decade of service. The teacher requested a hearing regarding the non-renewal, which was subsequently granted by the Board of Education. Thereafter, the Board of Education affirmed its decision to non-renew his contract. Twenty eight days later, the teacher filed a complaint in the Marion County Court of Common Pleas.
The school district responded by filing a motion to dismiss the complaint, which was granted by the court. The school district argued, and the court agreed, that before the complaint was filed, the teacher should have filed a notice of appeal with the Board of Education within 30 days of the decision of the Board not to renew the contract.
The appellate court agreed that the teacher has 30 days to file his appeal, and that appeal must first be filed with the Board of Education.
Tuesday, August 2, 2011
Two cases in the last week help shape school district's right to punish students for cyberbullying & cyberspeech
Two cases from two different federal appellate courts have reached similiar conclusions with respect to discipline of students for online, off-school activity. Though neither case comes from the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the court that hears federal appeals from Ohio, both cases are instructive as to how a similiar situation may be dealt with within the public schools of the state.
The first case came out of the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals, and originated in West Virginia. In that case, a student had created a fictious MySpace profile from home which was "largely dedicated to ridiculing a fellow student." The student invited approximately
100 people on her MySpace "friends" list to join the group. MySpace discussion groups allow registered users to post and respond to text, comments, and photographs in an interactive
fashion. Approximately two dozen High School students responded and ultimately joined the group, posting comments and pictures directed towards a particular student. The first student to join the group did so from a school computer during an after hours class.
The student who had been ridiculed's parents contacted the school district within a few hours and the site was changed.
School district officials believed that there was a sufficient nexus with the school to impose punishment. School administrators concluded that the student had created
a "hate website," in violation of the school policy against "harassment, bullying, and intimidation." For punishment, they suspended the student from school for and issued her
a "social suspension," which prevented her from attending school events in which she was not a direct participant.
The suspended student ultimately sued the school district for a purported violation of her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that they were authorized to punish
the student because her webpage was "created for the purpose of inviting others to indulge in disruptive and hateful conduct," which caused an "in-school disruption."
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the appeals court concluded that the student had used the Internet to orchestrate a targeted attack on a classmate and did so in a manner that was sufficiently connected to the school environment as to implicate the School District’s recognized authority to discipline speech which "materially and substantially interfere[es] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school and collid[es] with the rights of others." Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969).
The case caption is Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools.
In another case, from the Eighth District Court of Appeals, in a case that originated in Missouri, upheld the right of a school district to punish a student who had made death threats regarding other students via instant messenger. The threats were made by one student to his friend while both students were on their home computers. The student named particular students, and groups of students, and had said that he had wanted the school to be known for something.
Alarmed, the student receiving the instant messages contacted an adult, who contacted the principal. The student was then placed into juvenile detention. Subsequently, the school principal received a number of phone calls from concerned parents. Security was required to be increased. At that point, the district made the decision to suspend the student who had made the threats because it had been disruptive to the school environment.
The student subsequently returned to the school and graduated ahead of his class.
Nonetheless, his parents instituted a lawsuit, which found its way into federal court. With respect to the alleged violation of the student's First Amendment rights, the district court found that the court held that the student's speech had been an unprotected true threat and
alternatively that the District could properly discipline him for his speech because of
its disruptive impact on the school environment. The appeals court affirmed the decision.
The case is D.J.M v. Hannibal Public School District #60.
The bottom line with both of these cases is that the more of a nexus the speech has to the school, along with a reasonable showing of disruption to the school community, the more likely the courts will be in upholding student discipline involving cyberspeech.
The first case came out of the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals, and originated in West Virginia. In that case, a student had created a fictious MySpace profile from home which was "largely dedicated to ridiculing a fellow student." The student invited approximately
100 people on her MySpace "friends" list to join the group. MySpace discussion groups allow registered users to post and respond to text, comments, and photographs in an interactive
fashion. Approximately two dozen High School students responded and ultimately joined the group, posting comments and pictures directed towards a particular student. The first student to join the group did so from a school computer during an after hours class.
The student who had been ridiculed's parents contacted the school district within a few hours and the site was changed.
School district officials believed that there was a sufficient nexus with the school to impose punishment. School administrators concluded that the student had created
a "hate website," in violation of the school policy against "harassment, bullying, and intimidation." For punishment, they suspended the student from school for and issued her
a "social suspension," which prevented her from attending school events in which she was not a direct participant.
The suspended student ultimately sued the school district for a purported violation of her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that they were authorized to punish
the student because her webpage was "created for the purpose of inviting others to indulge in disruptive and hateful conduct," which caused an "in-school disruption."
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the appeals court concluded that the student had used the Internet to orchestrate a targeted attack on a classmate and did so in a manner that was sufficiently connected to the school environment as to implicate the School District’s recognized authority to discipline speech which "materially and substantially interfere[es] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school and collid[es] with the rights of others." Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969).
The case caption is Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools.
In another case, from the Eighth District Court of Appeals, in a case that originated in Missouri, upheld the right of a school district to punish a student who had made death threats regarding other students via instant messenger. The threats were made by one student to his friend while both students were on their home computers. The student named particular students, and groups of students, and had said that he had wanted the school to be known for something.
Alarmed, the student receiving the instant messages contacted an adult, who contacted the principal. The student was then placed into juvenile detention. Subsequently, the school principal received a number of phone calls from concerned parents. Security was required to be increased. At that point, the district made the decision to suspend the student who had made the threats because it had been disruptive to the school environment.
The student subsequently returned to the school and graduated ahead of his class.
Nonetheless, his parents instituted a lawsuit, which found its way into federal court. With respect to the alleged violation of the student's First Amendment rights, the district court found that the court held that the student's speech had been an unprotected true threat and
alternatively that the District could properly discipline him for his speech because of
its disruptive impact on the school environment. The appeals court affirmed the decision.
The case is D.J.M v. Hannibal Public School District #60.
The bottom line with both of these cases is that the more of a nexus the speech has to the school, along with a reasonable showing of disruption to the school community, the more likely the courts will be in upholding student discipline involving cyberspeech.
Wednesday, July 27, 2011
Law school not liable for alleged breach of contract, other causes of action
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit this morning affirmed a ruling by a trial court that granted summary judgment to the University of Dayton Law School on claims brought by a former law student for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and various torts.
In that case, brought in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, a student had been suspended from the law school for at least three semesters for purported violations of the law school's honor code.
The plaintiff made multiple allegations, including that the law school's Honor Council denied him the opportunity to impeach the prosecution’s student-witnesses and that it misconstrued the Law School’s “Quiet Period” rule, applying terms explained in a school-wide email from the Registrar, rather than an alternate, oral explanation that
that a dean at the law school had given the student.
It is well-settled that a student-university relationship is contractual in nature. However, universities generally have the right to make policies affecting them. Courts therefore will not interfere with a private university’s right to make regulations, establish requirements, set scholastic standards, and enforce disciplinary rules absent “a clear abuse of discretion.” Schoppelrei v. Franklin Univ., 228 N.E.2d 334, 336 (Ohio Ct. App. 1967).
Here, the appellate court upheld the finding that the the university did not abuse its discretion and did not breach the contract. Similarly, the appeals court affirmed the decision of the trial court with respect to the other errors brought to it by the student.
In that case, brought in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, a student had been suspended from the law school for at least three semesters for purported violations of the law school's honor code.
The plaintiff made multiple allegations, including that the law school's Honor Council denied him the opportunity to impeach the prosecution’s student-witnesses and that it misconstrued the Law School’s “Quiet Period” rule, applying terms explained in a school-wide email from the Registrar, rather than an alternate, oral explanation that
that a dean at the law school had given the student.
It is well-settled that a student-university relationship is contractual in nature. However, universities generally have the right to make policies affecting them. Courts therefore will not interfere with a private university’s right to make regulations, establish requirements, set scholastic standards, and enforce disciplinary rules absent “a clear abuse of discretion.” Schoppelrei v. Franklin Univ., 228 N.E.2d 334, 336 (Ohio Ct. App. 1967).
Here, the appellate court upheld the finding that the the university did not abuse its discretion and did not breach the contract. Similarly, the appeals court affirmed the decision of the trial court with respect to the other errors brought to it by the student.
Monday, July 18, 2011
College student properly dismissed, court rules
A college student who had been disciplined three different times was properly dismissed, an appeals court has ruled.
In that case, the student had been provided a copy of the student handbook at the beginning of his enrollment at the college. Thereafter, he had been disciplined three times. Accordingly, and purportedly pursuant to college policy, the student was permenantly dismissed from the program.
The student then brought a lawsuit, alleging a breach of contract.
The appeals court reiterated Ohio law that that "it is well-settled that there is a contract established when a student enrolls, pays tuition, and attends classes at a school. This contract is typically found in a handbook, catalogue, or other guideline. Smith v. Ohio State Univ. (1990), 53 Ohio Misc.2d 11, 13; Elliot v. Univ. of Cincinnati (1999), 134 Ohio App.3d 203. Furthermore, when dealing with such a breech, the court is to defer to the decisions of the school unless it can find " "such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the person or committee responsible did not actually exercise professional judgment.' " Bleicher v. Univ. of Cincinnati College of Med. (1992), 78 Ohio App.3d 302, 308; quoting Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing (1985), 474 U.S. 214, 225, 106 S.Ct. 507.
Here, however, the Court found that proper procedures were followed by the school in disciplining, and eventually removing appellant. These actions were spelled out in the contract (handbook) given to the student at the beginning of appellant's enrollment in the school," and were not a departure from any academic standards of which the Court was aware.
Thus, the student's dismissal was proper, according to the court.
In that case, the student had been provided a copy of the student handbook at the beginning of his enrollment at the college. Thereafter, he had been disciplined three times. Accordingly, and purportedly pursuant to college policy, the student was permenantly dismissed from the program.
The student then brought a lawsuit, alleging a breach of contract.
The appeals court reiterated Ohio law that that "it is well-settled that there is a contract established when a student enrolls, pays tuition, and attends classes at a school. This contract is typically found in a handbook, catalogue, or other guideline. Smith v. Ohio State Univ. (1990), 53 Ohio Misc.2d 11, 13; Elliot v. Univ. of Cincinnati (1999), 134 Ohio App.3d 203. Furthermore, when dealing with such a breech, the court is to defer to the decisions of the school unless it can find " "such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the person or committee responsible did not actually exercise professional judgment.' " Bleicher v. Univ. of Cincinnati College of Med. (1992), 78 Ohio App.3d 302, 308; quoting Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing (1985), 474 U.S. 214, 225, 106 S.Ct. 507.
Here, however, the Court found that proper procedures were followed by the school in disciplining, and eventually removing appellant. These actions were spelled out in the contract (handbook) given to the student at the beginning of appellant's enrollment in the school," and were not a departure from any academic standards of which the Court was aware.
Thus, the student's dismissal was proper, according to the court.
New study claims that Ohio schools show anti-gay bias
Although much attention has been focused on revision and enforcement of anti-bullying policies in Ohio, a new study claims that Ohio schools are doing a poor job at protecting GLBT students from bullying.
The study, done by Gay Lesbian Straight Education Network, reports some unfortunate statistics. Among them:
• 1 in 4 sexual minority students said they were physically assaulted - either punched, kicked or injured with a weapon - in the prior school year because of sexual orientation or gender identity. That is a higher than the national average of 18.8 percent.
• 1 in 3 such students said they were physically harassed - pushed or shoved - because of their orientation. Nationally the average was 40.1 percent.
• 70 percent said they were otherwise sexually harassed, 61 percent said they were "cyber-bullied," and 57 percent had property taken, stolen or damaged - all because of sexual or gender orientation, comparable to national statistics.
The complete article can be found at the Cincinnati Enquirer's website at http://news.cincinnati.com/article/20110714/NEWS0102/107150338/Study-Ohio-schools-show-anti-gay-climate?odyssey=tab|topnews|text|News.
The study, done by Gay Lesbian Straight Education Network, reports some unfortunate statistics. Among them:
• 1 in 4 sexual minority students said they were physically assaulted - either punched, kicked or injured with a weapon - in the prior school year because of sexual orientation or gender identity. That is a higher than the national average of 18.8 percent.
• 1 in 3 such students said they were physically harassed - pushed or shoved - because of their orientation. Nationally the average was 40.1 percent.
• 70 percent said they were otherwise sexually harassed, 61 percent said they were "cyber-bullied," and 57 percent had property taken, stolen or damaged - all because of sexual or gender orientation, comparable to national statistics.
The complete article can be found at the Cincinnati Enquirer's website at http://news.cincinnati.com/article/20110714/NEWS0102/107150338/Study-Ohio-schools-show-anti-gay-climate?odyssey=tab|topnews|text|News.
Tuesday, July 12, 2011
Summit County appeals court reverses trial court in bus driver retaliation case
The Ninth District Court of Appeals, which covers Summit County, has reversed the decision of a Summit County Court of Common Pleas that excluded certain evidence in an employment discrimination case against Nordonia Hills School District.
In that case, a bus driver had been terminated in 1998, allegedly for refusing to park her bus where it would have blocked a handicap sidewalk cutout. She subsequently filed a lawsuit and won her case after a jury trial. However, the court of appeals reversed the judgment and granted the school district a new trial. Before the new trial could take place, though, the parties reached a settlement. The bus driver was subsequently reinstated to her position in 2000.
In 2005, the bus driver was terminated again. This time, the bus driver essentially alleged that the school district terminated her in 2005 in retaliation for the prior litigation. She argued that certain individuals within the school district resented the prior litigation and the settlement she obtained. Further, she asserted that those
individuals purposefully set out to construct a documented disciplinary record that could serve as a basis for termination, not because she was an unfit bus driver, but because they intended to retaliate against her for the 1998 litigation.
The trial court, however, excluded almost all evidence of the 1998 settlement. The court of appeals found that the bus driver should have been able to submit such evidence and thus reversed the court of appeals.
In that case, a bus driver had been terminated in 1998, allegedly for refusing to park her bus where it would have blocked a handicap sidewalk cutout. She subsequently filed a lawsuit and won her case after a jury trial. However, the court of appeals reversed the judgment and granted the school district a new trial. Before the new trial could take place, though, the parties reached a settlement. The bus driver was subsequently reinstated to her position in 2000.
In 2005, the bus driver was terminated again. This time, the bus driver essentially alleged that the school district terminated her in 2005 in retaliation for the prior litigation. She argued that certain individuals within the school district resented the prior litigation and the settlement she obtained. Further, she asserted that those
individuals purposefully set out to construct a documented disciplinary record that could serve as a basis for termination, not because she was an unfit bus driver, but because they intended to retaliate against her for the 1998 litigation.
The trial court, however, excluded almost all evidence of the 1998 settlement. The court of appeals found that the bus driver should have been able to submit such evidence and thus reversed the court of appeals.
Wednesday, June 22, 2011
Court dismisses bullying lawsuit
A U.S. District Court Judge in northeast Ohio has dismissed a case brought against the Mentor School Board, Superintendent, high school principal, and others.
The lawsuit was brought on behalf of of a student who committed suicide, by his parents, alleging violations of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution. The complaint alleged that after months of persistent bullying in math class, the student shot himself. The school's failure to prevent this bullying violated the student's right to safety, and his parent's right to raise and educate their child in a safe environment, the complaint alleged.
U.S. District Court Judge Donald C. Nugent wrote "while it may seem that a
school, of all places, should provide a safe and supportive environment for the children in its care, neither party has cited any relevant law that would support a finding that the school was in a 'special relationship'" with the student to make the district liable for injury to the student. Furthermore, he wrote, "although it is
certainly reasonable for parents to expect that the school will do its best to protect their children while they are under the school’s supervision, the law does not elevate this expectation to a constitutional guarantee." Additionally, the court held, pursuant to federal precedent, that schools can only be held responsible for injury when they act affirmatively to put someone in danger, not for their failure to act.
Accordingly, the Judge dismissed the federal constitutional claims with prejudice (meaning that they cannot be brought again, absent a reversal on appeal) and dismissed the state law claims for negligence and bad faith, but left open the possibility that those claims could be brought in state court, if appropriate.
The ruling certainly has the potential to negatively impact, but not foreclose, school bullying lawsuits brought by students and their parents in Ohio. However, the court made clear that, at least as it stands now, generally, there is no special relationship between students and schools that would give rise to a constitutional right of protection to students. Whether or not the school acted affirmatively to cause the danger, however, will likely depend on the particular facts of each case.
The lawsuit was brought on behalf of of a student who committed suicide, by his parents, alleging violations of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution. The complaint alleged that after months of persistent bullying in math class, the student shot himself. The school's failure to prevent this bullying violated the student's right to safety, and his parent's right to raise and educate their child in a safe environment, the complaint alleged.
U.S. District Court Judge Donald C. Nugent wrote "while it may seem that a
school, of all places, should provide a safe and supportive environment for the children in its care, neither party has cited any relevant law that would support a finding that the school was in a 'special relationship'" with the student to make the district liable for injury to the student. Furthermore, he wrote, "although it is
certainly reasonable for parents to expect that the school will do its best to protect their children while they are under the school’s supervision, the law does not elevate this expectation to a constitutional guarantee." Additionally, the court held, pursuant to federal precedent, that schools can only be held responsible for injury when they act affirmatively to put someone in danger, not for their failure to act.
Accordingly, the Judge dismissed the federal constitutional claims with prejudice (meaning that they cannot be brought again, absent a reversal on appeal) and dismissed the state law claims for negligence and bad faith, but left open the possibility that those claims could be brought in state court, if appropriate.
The ruling certainly has the potential to negatively impact, but not foreclose, school bullying lawsuits brought by students and their parents in Ohio. However, the court made clear that, at least as it stands now, generally, there is no special relationship between students and schools that would give rise to a constitutional right of protection to students. Whether or not the school acted affirmatively to cause the danger, however, will likely depend on the particular facts of each case.
Friday, May 6, 2011
Court sides with University in elevator injury case.
The 10th District Court of Appeals has upheld a decision of the Ohio Court of Claims in a case that pitted a construction worker against Cleveland State University.
In that case, a worker in a dormitory was injured when a faulty elevator that he was working in fell eight stories. At the time of his injury, the University had leased the dormitory to a developer. While the University admitted it owned the elevator, it denied that it did not have possession or control of the elevator at the time of the incident. Thus, ir argued, it was not liable for the injury.
The Court of Claims and the appeals court agreed.
In that case, a worker in a dormitory was injured when a faulty elevator that he was working in fell eight stories. At the time of his injury, the University had leased the dormitory to a developer. While the University admitted it owned the elevator, it denied that it did not have possession or control of the elevator at the time of the incident. Thus, ir argued, it was not liable for the injury.
The Court of Claims and the appeals court agreed.
Monday, April 18, 2011
Plain Dealer examines effect of Senate Bill 5 on school districts
The Cleveland Plain Dealer published an article this week that surveyed the effect Senate Bill 5 would have on school districts.
Among the most drastic changes for school personnel are the elimination of pension "pick ups," the elimination of binding arbitration, and the elimination of longevity pay and step increases.
Of course, opponents of SB 5 are mobilized, attempting to ensure that these changes never take effect, by putting the measure to the voters in the November 2011 general election.
That article can be accessed here: http://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/2011/04/new_collective_bargaining_law.html
Among the most drastic changes for school personnel are the elimination of pension "pick ups," the elimination of binding arbitration, and the elimination of longevity pay and step increases.
Of course, opponents of SB 5 are mobilized, attempting to ensure that these changes never take effect, by putting the measure to the voters in the November 2011 general election.
That article can be accessed here: http://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/2011/04/new_collective_bargaining_law.html
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