Sixth Circuit adopts two year statute of limitations for disability discrimination cases in Ohio

In a case brought against Miami (Ohio) University, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has now clarified that claims brought against universities are subject to a two-year statute of limitations in Ohio. Moreover, cases brought by students or former students against their universities based on either Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act or the Americans with Disabilities Act must be filed within two years, or they will be time-barred. The case is McCormick v. Miami University.

Federal Court agrees that doctoral student was given due process

The 6th Circuit Court of Appeals, this week, upheld the decision of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, which granted summary judgment to Wayne State University and Wayne State officials. In that case, a doctoral student sued school officials after having her doctoral degree revoked. The university accused the student of plagarizing portions of her doctoral thesis. The student had argued, among other things, that school officials have violated the 14th Amendment's due process clause by (1) not providing her sufficient notice that her degree could be revoked or (2) that the procedures utilized by the University were inadequate. Both the district court and the court of appeals disagreed with the student.

Court of Appeals reverses student's expulsion due to school board error

The Fourth District Court of Appeals this week has reversed a school board's decision to expel a student because the school board failed hold a hearing within the time limits contained in R.C. 3313.66(B)(6), among other reasons. In November 2009, a student allegedly attacked another student. The Superintendent notified the student that she may be expelled and subsequently held a hearing at the student's request, but did so outside the time frame provided in the Ohio Revised Code. Nonetheless, the Superintendent and School Board decided to expel the student. Because the hearing in front of the Superintendent took place outside the statutory time frame, and for other reasons, the trial court reversed the decision of the school board and ruled that the student must be reinstated. The appeals court upheld the decision of the trial court. This case highlights the importance that parents and students be cognizant about both procedural and substantive rights that they have when dealing with a public school disciplinary issue, and would be well advised to seek counsel as soon as practical.

6th Circuit sides with parents in IEP dispute

The United States Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit, which covers Ohio, has reversed the decision of a U.S. District Court in Kentucky to dismiss a parents' claims under IDEA and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. In that case, the parents filed a due process complaint alleging, among other things, that their son's IEP, implemented in 2004, was inadequate because he was not receiving certain services. A hearing was held and the hearing officer agreed with the school district in some respects, but found that the 2004 IEP was, as the parents suggested, inadequate. The hearing officer also found that the school district should have to reimburse the parents for certain tutoring expenses incurred as a result of the state's failure to provide the student a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE). The school appealed the decision to Kentucky's Exceptional Children Appeals' Board (ECAB) that the district had not been given proper notice that the complaint included a charge that the child was not receiving proper services under the 2004 IEP. The ECAB agreed, and reversed the hearing officer. The parents then filed a lawsuit, requesting the hearing officer's decision stand, and also alleging that the school district had violated the child's rights under 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The district court found in favor of the parents, reversing the ECAB regarding the notice issue, but dismissed the 504 claim. Both parties appealed. Finding that the school district did have proper notice, the 6th Circuit affirmed the district court's opinion as to that count. However, the appeals court found that the district court committed error with respect to dismissing the rest of the IEP and 504 claims and sent the case back to the district court for further proceedings. It is important to note, as the appeals court did here, that the complaint was filed when the child was in 6th grade. He is now getting ready to graduate high school.

Sixth Circuit reinstates graduate student's lawsuit based on student's refusal to counsel gay men and women on their same sex relationships

The U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has reinstated the lawsuit of a graduate student at Eastern Michigan University (EMU) that had been dismissed by the District Court over her disagreement over counseling gay clients.

In that case, Eastern Michigan University prohibited its counseling students from discriminating against others based on sexual orientation and taught students to affirm a client’s values during counseling sessions. A graduate student in school counseling had consistently clashed with her professors regarding her purportedly held Christian beliefs that prohibited her from affirming same sex relationships (and heterosexual conduct like extra-marital relationships). Despite this ongoing dispute, the graduate student did well in the program and continued towards her degree.

Towards the end of her program, the student, who had a 3.91 GPA, was asked to counsel a gay client. The graduate student asked that the gay client be referred to another counselor based on her beliefs. The client was referred to another counselor and disciplinary action was taken against the graduate student. She was, in fact, dismissed from the program.

The graduate student subsequently filed a lawsuit against the university, claiming an infringement of her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The District Court dismissed the case on summary judgment. The graduate student appealed.

While recognizing that universities have discretion in curriculum choices, the Sixth Circuit determined that a reasonable jury could have found, when the facts were viewed most favorably towards the graduate student, that it was error for the university to have a no referral policy, as the same could have violated the graduate student's constitutional rights.

This does not mean that the graduate student wins the case. Rather, it just means that the matter can proceed to a jury trial.

Law firm invoices, other documents, protected by attorney-client privilege, Supreme Court rules

The Supreme Court of Ohio refused to grant a writ of mandamus, this week, in a public records request case that pitted a school district versus a parent. In that case, the parent had sought access to (1)itemized invoices of law firms providing services to the district in matters pertaining to the parent and her children and (2) communications from the school district’s insurance carrier identifying attorney Janet Cooper as the district’s legal representative and describing the liability and exposure of the district and insurance company related to a case filed against the district by the parent on behalf of one of her children.

The school district provided the parent with summaries of the
invoices noting the attorney’s name, the invoice total, and the matter involved.
The district did not, however, provide the parent with the requested itemized
invoices, because they contained what it considered to be confidential
information, stating, that the itemized monthly statements contain descriptions of
the work performed by the attorneys of Bricker and Eckler, L.L.P. and include:
statements regarding their communications to each other and insurance counsel; the areas and issues the attorneys researched; and the legal issues
upon which they focused their attention.

After protracted requests and negotiations, the parent filed a request with the Supreme Court that the school district be ordered to turn over the records. Ultimately, the Supreme Court determined that the records requested were confidential and privileged, due to attorney-client privilege between the district and its counsel.

Exception does not apply; Sixth Circuit affirms dismissal of parents' IDEA Complaint

The 6th Circuit Court of Appeals this morning upheld a district court's dismissal of a lawsuit brought pursuant to IDEA because the parents refused to exhaust their administrative remedies.

In that case, the student had been diagnosed with Asperger’s Disorder,
Attention Deficit Hyper Activity Disorder, Anxiety Disorder, and Major Depressive Disorder. During the second half of the 2008-09 school year the student's performance began to decline and he developed anger issues and demonstrated explosive behavior.

As a result of these changes, the parents requested that a Multifactored Evaluation (MFE) be performed. The school district initially refused, and ultimately concluded that the child did not meet the definition of disabled under IDEA and was therefore not entitled to an Individualized Education Plan (IEP). After additional information was submitted to the school district, and additional negotiations took place, the parents filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio alleging violations of, inter alia, the Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA). The district court then put on an agreed order that the school district would perform an MFE, which the district subsequently conducted.

The school district then filed a motion to dismiss the action, alleging the parents had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. Further, the parents filed a motion for attorney fees, alleging that they were the prevailing party because the school district agreed to perform an MFE.

Generally, before filing a lawsuit under IDEA, parents are required to exhaust state administrative remedies. This requirement does have an exception when it would be futile or inadequate to protect a plaintiff's rights.

Here, the Court found that the exception did not apply and that the trial court properly dismissed the complaint because the parents had not filed a request for an administrative hearing.

Two cases in the last week help shape school district's right to punish students for cyberbullying & cyberspeech

Two cases from two different federal appellate courts have reached similiar conclusions with respect to discipline of students for online, off-school activity. Though neither case comes from the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the court that hears federal appeals from Ohio, both cases are instructive as to how a similiar situation may be dealt with within the public schools of the state.

The first case came out of the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals, and originated in West Virginia. In that case, a student had created a fictious MySpace profile from home which was "largely dedicated to ridiculing a fellow student." The student invited approximately
100 people on her MySpace "friends" list to join the group. MySpace discussion groups allow registered users to post and respond to text, comments, and photographs in an interactive
fashion. Approximately two dozen High School students responded and ultimately joined the group, posting comments and pictures directed towards a particular student. The first student to join the group did so from a school computer during an after hours class.

The student who had been ridiculed's parents contacted the school district within a few hours and the site was changed.

School district officials believed that there was a sufficient nexus with the school to impose punishment. School administrators concluded that the student had created
a "hate website," in violation of the school policy against "harassment, bullying, and intimidation." For punishment, they suspended the student from school for and issued her
a "social suspension," which prevented her from attending school events in which she was not a direct participant.

The suspended student ultimately sued the school district for a purported violation of her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that they were authorized to punish
the student because her webpage was "created for the purpose of inviting others to indulge in disruptive and hateful conduct," which caused an "in-school disruption."

In affirming the decision of the trial court, the appeals court concluded that the student had used the Internet to orchestrate a targeted attack on a classmate and did so in a manner that was sufficiently connected to the school environment as to implicate the School District’s recognized authority to discipline speech which "materially and substantially interfere[es] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school and collid[es] with the rights of others." Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969).

The case caption is Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools.

In another case, from the Eighth District Court of Appeals, in a case that originated in Missouri, upheld the right of a school district to punish a student who had made death threats regarding other students via instant messenger. The threats were made by one student to his friend while both students were on their home computers. The student named particular students, and groups of students, and had said that he had wanted the school to be known for something.

Alarmed, the student receiving the instant messages contacted an adult, who contacted the principal. The student was then placed into juvenile detention. Subsequently, the school principal received a number of phone calls from concerned parents. Security was required to be increased. At that point, the district made the decision to suspend the student who had made the threats because it had been disruptive to the school environment.

The student subsequently returned to the school and graduated ahead of his class.

Nonetheless, his parents instituted a lawsuit, which found its way into federal court. With respect to the alleged violation of the student's First Amendment rights, the district court found that the court held that the student's speech had been an unprotected true threat and
alternatively that the District could properly discipline him for his speech because of
its disruptive impact on the school environment. The appeals court affirmed the decision.

The case is D.J.M v. Hannibal Public School District #60.

The bottom line with both of these cases is that the more of a nexus the speech has to the school, along with a reasonable showing of disruption to the school community, the more likely the courts will be in upholding student discipline involving cyberspeech.

Law school not liable for alleged breach of contract, other causes of action

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit this morning affirmed a ruling by a trial court that granted summary judgment to the University of Dayton Law School on claims brought by a former law student for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and various torts.

In that case, brought in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, a student had been suspended from the law school for at least three semesters for purported violations of the law school's honor code.

The plaintiff made multiple allegations, including that the law school's Honor Council denied him the opportunity to impeach the prosecution’s student-witnesses and that it misconstrued the Law School’s “Quiet Period” rule, applying terms explained in a school-wide email from the Registrar, rather than an alternate, oral explanation that
that a dean at the law school had given the student.

It is well-settled that a student-university relationship is contractual in nature. However, universities generally have the right to make policies affecting them. Courts therefore will not interfere with a private university’s right to make regulations, establish requirements, set scholastic standards, and enforce disciplinary rules absent “a clear abuse of discretion.” Schoppelrei v. Franklin Univ., 228 N.E.2d 334, 336 (Ohio Ct. App. 1967).

Here, the appellate court upheld the finding that the the university did not abuse its discretion and did not breach the contract. Similarly, the appeals court affirmed the decision of the trial court with respect to the other errors brought to it by the student.

College student properly dismissed, court rules

A college student who had been disciplined three different times was properly dismissed, an appeals court has ruled.

In that case, the student had been provided a copy of the student handbook at the beginning of his enrollment at the college. Thereafter, he had been disciplined three times. Accordingly, and purportedly pursuant to college policy, the student was permenantly dismissed from the program.

The student then brought a lawsuit, alleging a breach of contract.

The appeals court reiterated Ohio law that that "it is well-settled that there is a contract established when a student enrolls, pays tuition, and attends classes at a school. This contract is typically found in a handbook, catalogue, or other guideline. Smith v. Ohio State Univ. (1990), 53 Ohio Misc.2d 11, 13; Elliot v. Univ. of Cincinnati (1999), 134 Ohio App.3d 203. Furthermore, when dealing with such a breech, the court is to defer to the decisions of the school unless it can find " "such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the person or committee responsible did not actually exercise professional judgment.' " Bleicher v. Univ. of Cincinnati College of Med. (1992), 78 Ohio App.3d 302, 308; quoting Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing (1985), 474 U.S. 214, 225, 106 S.Ct. 507.

Here, however, the Court found that proper procedures were followed by the school in disciplining, and eventually removing appellant. These actions were spelled out in the contract (handbook) given to the student at the beginning of appellant's enrollment in the school," and were not a departure from any academic standards of which the Court was aware.

Thus, the student's dismissal was proper, according to the court.

Court dismisses bullying lawsuit

A U.S. District Court Judge in northeast Ohio has dismissed a case brought against the Mentor School Board, Superintendent, high school principal, and others.

The lawsuit was brought on behalf of of a student who committed suicide, by his parents, alleging violations of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution. The complaint alleged that after months of persistent bullying in math class, the student shot himself. The school's failure to prevent this bullying violated the student's right to safety, and his parent's right to raise and educate their child in a safe environment, the complaint alleged.

U.S. District Court Judge Donald C. Nugent wrote "while it may seem that a
school, of all places, should provide a safe and supportive environment for the children in its care, neither party has cited any relevant law that would support a finding that the school was in a 'special relationship'" with the student to make the district liable for injury to the student. Furthermore, he wrote, "although it is
certainly reasonable for parents to expect that the school will do its best to protect their children while they are under the school’s supervision, the law does not elevate this expectation to a constitutional guarantee." Additionally, the court held, pursuant to federal precedent, that schools can only be held responsible for injury when they act affirmatively to put someone in danger, not for their failure to act.

Accordingly, the Judge dismissed the federal constitutional claims with prejudice (meaning that they cannot be brought again, absent a reversal on appeal) and dismissed the state law claims for negligence and bad faith, but left open the possibility that those claims could be brought in state court, if appropriate.

The ruling certainly has the potential to negatively impact, but not foreclose, school bullying lawsuits brought by students and their parents in Ohio. However, the court made clear that, at least as it stands now, generally, there is no special relationship between students and schools that would give rise to a constitutional right of protection to students. Whether or not the school acted affirmatively to cause the danger, however, will likely depend on the particular facts of each case.

Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses parents' bullying case; case continues in federal court

The Supreme Court of Ohio unanimously dismissed a school bullying case yesterday that had been sent to it from a federal court in Cleveland.

That suit was filed by the parents of a Mentor high school student who committed suicide. The parents allege in their complaint that their son had been bullied for months at school, including by a student who told him the day before his death, "Why don't you go home and shoot yourself? Nobody would miss you." The parents allege that the student "endured harassment and bullying at school at the hands of numerous other students." He was also, according to the complaint, forced to endure "name-calling, teasing and verbal intimidation in one particular class and constant pushing, shoving and hitting both in class and in hallways of the high school. The name-calling was usually sexually themed."

The Supreme Court's dismissal of the case does not end the suit, however, which will now proceed in federal court.

"School Day Security and Anti-Bullying Act" introduced in Ohio House

Representative John Barnes, Jr. has introduced House Bill 116, or the "School Day Security and Anti-Bullying Act" for consideration by the Ohio House of Representatives. The proposed Act would require school districts to be more aggressive with their education efforts on anti-bullying policies.

Under current Ohio law, school districts are required to publish their bullying policy in the student handbook and include the policy in school employee training handbooks. Under this proposal, districts would be required to, twice in every school year, provide each student with age-appropriate instruction on the board's policies prohibiting harassment, intimidation, and bullying. The first instruction must be given toward the beginning of the school year and the second offered during the second semester. Additionally, the consequences for violations must be taught and an acknowledgment of receipt must be signed by the parent or guardian and returned to the school.

The bill does not change the definition of bullying under Ohio law, which defines that intimidation, harassment, or bullying as any of the following "(1) Any intentional written, verbal, or physical act that a student has exhibited toward another particular student more than once and the behavior both:

(a) Causes mental or physical harm to the other student;

(b) Is sufficiently severe, persistent, or pervasive that it creates an intimidating, threatening, or abusive educational environment for the other student.

(2) Violence within a dating relationship." R.C. 3313.666

Ohio school district to require students to undergo breathalyzer before entering school dance. Is it constitutional?

The Columbus Dispatch today is reporting that students at Medina High School, in Medina, Ohio, will have to take a breathalzyer test before attending the school's sweatheart dance. http://www.dispatch.com/live/content/local_news/stories/2011/01/27/27-Ohio-school-requires-breathalyzer-test-at-dances.html?sid=101

The new rule takes effect as a result of two students showing up drunk to the school's homecoming dance.

But is the school district permitted to take such a step under the U.S. Constitution? Maybe. Almost thirty years ago, the Ohio Attorney General issued an opinion that school boards may administer breath tests when students are suspected of having consumed alcoholic beverages. The board has to have found that such rules and regulations are ncessary to the effective management of their schools. 1983 OAG No. 012.

Nonetheless, such a policy must still conform to constitutional mandates, no matter what the Attorney General believes. If a particular student is reasonably believed to be under the influence, there seems to be not much doubt that a student could be required to undergo a breathalyzer. The odor of alcohol and impaired behavior may be enough to reach the "reasonable" standard in this context. See e.g. Martinez v. School Dist. No. 60, 852 P.2d

The more difficult question is can the test be required to ALL students before entering the school dance. The U.S. Supreme Court has upheld random, suspicionless drug testing of all students engaged in competitive extracurricular activities. However, courts generally require such testing policies set forth adequate safeguards to ensure reliability, privacy during testing, and confidentiality of results. See e.g. Crager v. Bd. of Educ., 313 F. Supp. 2d 690 (6th Cir. 2004). It seems likely that the breath-testing will be done in front of a number of people, including other students, and that the results will not remain private (students would be denied admission at the door). Furthermore, since high school students are not allowed to legally consume alcohol, the threat of prosecution may face those who test positive. However, the argument exists that extracurricular activities like school dances are voluntary affairs, and that the student's interests to be free from search and seizure are diminished.

In the end, there is no clear answer as to whether or not all students can be forced to undergo breath tests before entering the school dance. On a whole, when viewed in light of existing precedent, the case law seems to be on the side of the school district.

Student search by school official constitutional even if tip came from law enforcement, appeals court rules

A divided Fifth District Court of Appeals held today that the search of a student for drugs was constitutional, even though the school official who searched the student was given the tip by a law enforcement officer.

In that case, an assistant principal was given a tip by a deputy sheriff stationed inside the school that a student in the school may have been dealing heroin. The assistant principal then requested that the student come to the office with his bookbag. The assistant principal and the deputy sheriff both testified that the school official did so at the school official's sole request, and not at the behest of the deputy sheriff. During the search, drugs were found and the student was subsequently prosecuted.

The legal question to be answered by the court was what standard was required to justify the search. Generally, school officials can conduct searches when they believe that school rules and regulations have been violated, so long as the search is reasonable under the circumstances. This is a much more relaxed standard than the probable cause standard, which is generally required to conduct most searches.

The student had argued that, because the search was initiated as a result of the law enforcement officer tipping off the assistant principal, the probable cause standard should control. However, the prosecution argued, and the trial court held, that because the school official was working independently, and not at the behest of, the law enforcement officer, the reasonableness standard should prevail.

The Court of Appeals, 2-1, agreed with the trial court that the lower "reasonableness" standard should control. Because, in its opinion, the search was reasonable under the circumstances, the search of the student was constitutional.

The Fifth District Court of Appeals handles cases from Ashland, Coshocton, Delaware, Fairfield, Guernsey, Holmes, Knox, Licking, Morgan, Morrow, Muskingum, Perry, Richland, Stark and Tuscarawas Counties.

Driver of chartered bus covered under university's automobile insurance policy, Supreme Court rules

The Supreme Court of Ohio ruled today that when an auto insurance policy issued to a university extends liability coverage to any person operating “with permission” a vehicle that is “owned, hired or borrowed” by the university, that language provides coverage for injuries resulting from a traffic accident in which a bus driver employed by a charter bus company was operating the company’s bus while it was under charter by the university.

This case deals with the tragic bus accident that killed and injured a number of members of the Bluffton University baseball team in March 2007 (as well as the bus driver and his wife). It is believed that the bus driver thought that he was in the carpool lane but really was on a highway exit ramp. The bus then plunged off the overpass onto the highway below.

The charter bus company has already paid $5 million, while the State of Georgia has paid $3 million. The court's ruling, which overturned the decision of the 3rd District Court of Appeals' decision, could mean an additional $21 million dollars for the victims and the victims' families.

Sixth Circuit upholds school district's categorical ban on wearing of Confederate flag

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit sided with a school district in Tennesee in a dispute about whether or not a school district may ban a student from wearing the Confederate flag.

In that case, the student and his father sued the school district after he had been repeatedly required to remove or otherwise conceal Confederate flags he had been wearing. The school district had a policy that “[c]lothing and accessories such as backpacks, patches, jewelry, and notebooks must not display (1) racial or ethnic slurs/symbols, (2) gang affiliations, (3) vulgar, subversive, or sexually suggestive language or images; nor, should they promote products which students may not legally buy; such as alcohol, tobacco, and illegal drugs.” The student contended that this policy violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The school district contended that the policy was necessary so as to not disrupt the educational process. (The school district had a history of racial problems, including even a bombing of the high school after integration). Ultimately, the trial court granted summary judgment to the school district.

In analyzing the student's claims, the Sixth Circuit reviewed the relevant U.S. Supreme Court precedents on point, namely, Tinker v. Des Moines, Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, and Morse v. Frederick. The Sixth Circuit then concluded that "cases yield three principles: (1) under Fraser, a
school may categorically prohibit vulgar, lewd, indecent, or plainly
offensive student speech, Fraser, (2) under Hazelwood,
a school has limited authority to censor school-sponsored student speech
in a manner consistent with pedagogical concerns, and (3) the Tinker standard applies to all other student speech and allows regulation only when the school reasonably believes that the speech will substantially and materially interfere with schoolwork or
discipline." [The Court noted that Morse was a case that had no application here.]

In reviewing the claim under this approach, the Court held that the school district had a reasonable belief that the speech would substantially and materially interfere with schoolwork or discipline. The school district was able to cite to numerous instances of racial discord within the school in the last several years. Additionally, the Court turned back Plaintiff's claims that there was viewpoint discrimination because the policy was written and enforced (for the most part) even-handedly.

Columbus City Schools targeted by national group

A national group has filed a Complaint against the Columbus City Schools with the United States Department of Education, alleging violations of Title IX.



As can be read about here, http://www.dispatch.com/live/content/local_news/stories/2010/11/11/girls-access-called-unequal.html?sid=101 the group is alleging that the Columbus City Schools discriminate against females in athletics.



Title IX, originally passed in 1972, provides that "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance..."



Though the original statute has no mention of sports in it, it is best known for its impact on female athletics.



Columbus is one of 12 school districts targeted by the National Women's Law Center. Each of the districts that had complaints filed against them had at least double digit dispartities between the percentage of female students versus the number of female athletes.

Student's expulsion appeal untimely, court of appeals rules

The Tenth District Court of Appeals, which covers Columbus and Franklin County, upheld the dismissal of a student's appeal of his expulsion for smoking marijuana prior to attending school.

In that case, the student had been expelled from school for allegedly smoking marijuana before class. The student and his parents appealed the expulsion decision and pursued a hearing on the matter. After the hearing, the school board upheld the expulsion and sent written notice to the student on December 21, 2009.

Thereafter, the student and his parents filed suit on January 20, 2010, appealing the administrative decision of the Board. In dismissing the case, the Court found that the student and his parents had not followed the proper procedure because R.C. 2505.07 requires appeals to be filed within 30 days of the decision, and for the appeal to be filed with the administrative agency, not the court.

Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed and the expulsion stands.

University liable for dorm room break in

The Court of Claims today held that when a university dormitory door has a defect, it is liable for damages resulting from a break-in of that door.

In that case, a student at Ohio University ("OU") had his belongings stolen from his dorm room over Christmas break. A review by OU maintenance determined that the anti-pick device on the dormitory door was not installed properly.

Pointing to Chetsko v. Miami Univ., Ct. of Cl. No. 2007-03960-AD, 2007-Ohio-4395 and
Smith v. Miami Univ., Ct. of Cl. No. 2008-10501-AD, 2009-Ohio-2418, the Court of Claims held the university liable for the replacement costs of the stolen goods as well as the filing fee and court costs.