Case Western Reserve University did not breach its contract with a student when the school dismissed him from its medical school, the Eighth District Court of Appeals ruled last week.
In that case, the medical student was put on leave after failing four exams during his second year of medical school. He was also required to complete a program focusing on interpersonal communications skills and counseling. After completion of the program, the student would be considered for restarting his second year.
The student went on to repeat his second year at the medical school. However, he was referred to the Committee on Students in Spring 2005 after a faculty member wrote a letter complaining about his behavior in the faculty member's lab (2) an incident that had occurred earlier in his career in which a female student complained that he was harassing her and (3) the student's failure to remediate a failed exam. The Committee required the student to remediate the exam and submit a "fitness for duty" examination.
The fitness for duty exam concluded that the student had a personality disorder and had an inability to perceive or admit to his own mistakes. The report noted that the student believed himself to be superior, was unable to self-evaluate and self-criticize, and is interpersonally exploitative and lacks sympathy. The examiner viewed those traits as a "concern to anyone training a medical student."
Thereafter, the committee reviewed this and other information and decided to dismiss the medical student. He appealed his dismissal, though the committee's decision was ultimately upheld. A Dean of the medical school gave the student the option to withdraw before the letter dismissing him was issued. The student submitted a letter to the Dean withdrawing him, though he could not recall whether he was told that his record would reflect that he withdrew in lieu of dismissal.
The student then filed suit. He claimed that (1) Case was required to provide him with written notice of the grounds upon which the school intended to dismiss him, and with a hearing at which he could be present (2) there are material facts as to whether Case complied with its own contractual procedures in dismissing him.
As to these grounds, the court found that Case, as a private institution, owed no constitutional right of due process. Additionally, the court found that though there was custom to allow the student to be present during the Committee hearing, the custom did not rise to the leval of a contractual obligation.
Furthermore, the student requested declaratory judgment prohibiting the school from placing a notation on his file that he "withdrew in lieu of dismissal." The Court upheld the trial court's refusal to issue a declaratory judgment prohibiting such a notation on the file.
Tuesday, April 6, 2010
Monday, April 5, 2010
Public school may be liable if employees were reckless, says appeals court
A school district may be liable if its public employees acted recklessly, the 9th district appeals court ruled last week in E.F. v. Oberlin City School District. At the same time, the court ruled that, as to the facts of that particular case, the school district was not liable under other theories of liability.
In that case, E.F., a child with Down syndrome, filed a complaint against the school district, the board of education, and certain employees of the school district after she was purportedly sexually assaulted on school grounds by two boys. The amended
complaint contained counts alleging negligence and recklessness; violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Act; violations of R.C. Chapter 3323; as well as intentional infliction of emotional distress. It also stated that the sexual assault occurred as the result of "extreme lack of teacher oversight."
The defendants sought judgment on the pleadings, requesting that the court find in their favor without a trial. After the plaintiffs answered, the trial court granted the defendants' motion, finding no liability on any of the defendants. The plaintiffs then appealled.
The appeals court agreed with the trial court's findings, except that the Court believed that E.F's cause of action alleging employee recklessness should be able to go forward. Indeed, the amended complaint stated (1) that E.F. was sexually assaulted under circumstances where there was a “recklessness and an extreme
lack of teacher oversight relating to the facts of these incidents," (2) that a substitute teacher was responsible for monitoring the classroom at the time of multiple incidents where E.F. was assaulted (3) that the school was aware that one of the students who attacked E.F. had “a history of *** psychological issues relating to abuse and assault," (4) that “Oberlin Schools recklessly placed these students into a class with mentally handicapped students, such as E.F, with full knowledge of such student’s (sic) propensity to abuse the disabled students in the classroom," (5) that “Defendants also acted recklessly in the monitoring of classrooms which E.F was in” and further that “[a]ll regular teachers and substitute teachers acted recklessly in monitoring the children of his/her classroom by failing to even notice when students disappeared from the classroom.” The complaint also states that the recklessness of teachers “resulted in E.F. being sexually assaulted by the [s]tudents.”
The reversal by the appeals court does not mean that the school district is in fact liable, but rather that the Plaintiffs should have an opportunity to attempt to prove that the school district is liable because its employees acted recklessly.
In that case, E.F., a child with Down syndrome, filed a complaint against the school district, the board of education, and certain employees of the school district after she was purportedly sexually assaulted on school grounds by two boys. The amended
complaint contained counts alleging negligence and recklessness; violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Act; violations of R.C. Chapter 3323; as well as intentional infliction of emotional distress. It also stated that the sexual assault occurred as the result of "extreme lack of teacher oversight."
The defendants sought judgment on the pleadings, requesting that the court find in their favor without a trial. After the plaintiffs answered, the trial court granted the defendants' motion, finding no liability on any of the defendants. The plaintiffs then appealled.
The appeals court agreed with the trial court's findings, except that the Court believed that E.F's cause of action alleging employee recklessness should be able to go forward. Indeed, the amended complaint stated (1) that E.F. was sexually assaulted under circumstances where there was a “recklessness and an extreme
lack of teacher oversight relating to the facts of these incidents," (2) that a substitute teacher was responsible for monitoring the classroom at the time of multiple incidents where E.F. was assaulted (3) that the school was aware that one of the students who attacked E.F. had “a history of *** psychological issues relating to abuse and assault," (4) that “Oberlin Schools recklessly placed these students into a class with mentally handicapped students, such as E.F, with full knowledge of such student’s (sic) propensity to abuse the disabled students in the classroom," (5) that “Defendants also acted recklessly in the monitoring of classrooms which E.F was in” and further that “[a]ll regular teachers and substitute teachers acted recklessly in monitoring the children of his/her classroom by failing to even notice when students disappeared from the classroom.” The complaint also states that the recklessness of teachers “resulted in E.F. being sexually assaulted by the [s]tudents.”
The reversal by the appeals court does not mean that the school district is in fact liable, but rather that the Plaintiffs should have an opportunity to attempt to prove that the school district is liable because its employees acted recklessly.
Tuesday, March 9, 2010
Federal court dismisses complaint against Ohio University
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio dismissed a case brought against Ohio University by a graduate doctor of the College of Osteopathic Medicine.
The case centered upon whether or not a state university may demand reimbursement from an out of state student who reneged on promises to practice in Ohio after graduation.
The university regularly collects six-figure annual sums from out-of-state alumni of its College of Osteopathic Medicine who default on a contractual agreement they must sign to be enrolled.
Non-Ohio residents who want to attend the medical school must agree to practice in Ohio for five years. Those who renege must pay back what the state invested in their education.
The student filed suit, alleging that the contract violates the "commerce clause" of the U.S. Constitution because the payment the university exacts for default is a penalty for opening a medical practice in another state and therefore an illegal restriction on interstate commerce.
The Court dismissed the case on procedural grounds without reaching the merits of the case, finding that the student was outside the statute of limitations to bring such a claim.
The case centered upon whether or not a state university may demand reimbursement from an out of state student who reneged on promises to practice in Ohio after graduation.
The university regularly collects six-figure annual sums from out-of-state alumni of its College of Osteopathic Medicine who default on a contractual agreement they must sign to be enrolled.
Non-Ohio residents who want to attend the medical school must agree to practice in Ohio for five years. Those who renege must pay back what the state invested in their education.
The student filed suit, alleging that the contract violates the "commerce clause" of the U.S. Constitution because the payment the university exacts for default is a penalty for opening a medical practice in another state and therefore an illegal restriction on interstate commerce.
The Court dismissed the case on procedural grounds without reaching the merits of the case, finding that the student was outside the statute of limitations to bring such a claim.
Monday, March 8, 2010
Court finds school district not liable for sex abuse
The Twelfth District Court of Appeals today has upheld a trial court's decision finding that a public school district is not liable for sex abuse of a student when, among other things, the abuse happens off of school grounds.
The case involves a minor student who participated in a special needs tutoring program. The tutoring was supposed to occur at the local library, but at some point started taking place at the tutor's house. The tutor and the student ended up engaging in sexual activity at her home. Subsequently, the tutor was criminally charged, pled guilty, and she served a six month prison sentence (as well as now being a registered sex offender).
Thereafter, the student filed suit against the school district. However, because the actions of the employee took place off of school grounds, and because the claim did not involve 'physical defects' of the school grounds, both the trial court and the appellate court were unwilling to find liability on the part of the school district.
The case involves a minor student who participated in a special needs tutoring program. The tutoring was supposed to occur at the local library, but at some point started taking place at the tutor's house. The tutor and the student ended up engaging in sexual activity at her home. Subsequently, the tutor was criminally charged, pled guilty, and she served a six month prison sentence (as well as now being a registered sex offender).
Thereafter, the student filed suit against the school district. However, because the actions of the employee took place off of school grounds, and because the claim did not involve 'physical defects' of the school grounds, both the trial court and the appellate court were unwilling to find liability on the part of the school district.
Wednesday, February 24, 2010
Central Ohio school district bans PG-13, R-rated films
The Marysville School District has, at least temporarily, banned PG-13 and R rated movies from the school's curriculum. The ban is the result of complaints by parents that such films contain too mature of a content for high school students. Thus, historical films like "Schindler's List" and "Saving Private Ryan" will now be off limits to students within that district.
Generally, courts uphold the right of boards of education to make decisions like which course materials to use against the constitutional claims of students and teachers alike. However, the case may be different if these materials are held in the library where students may access them, and are being removed "simply because they dislike the ideas contained in those books and seek by their removal to 'prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, and other matters of opinion.'"
However, showing the films in a classroom (as opposed to private student viewing) may be more likely to bear the school's 'imprimatur' and probably can, consistent with the First Amendment, be banned pursuant to school board policy. See e.g. Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260.
Generally, courts uphold the right of boards of education to make decisions like which course materials to use against the constitutional claims of students and teachers alike. However, the case may be different if these materials are held in the library where students may access them, and are being removed "simply because they dislike the ideas contained in those books and seek by their removal to 'prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, and other matters of opinion.'"
However, showing the films in a classroom (as opposed to private student viewing) may be more likely to bear the school's 'imprimatur' and probably can, consistent with the First Amendment, be banned pursuant to school board policy. See e.g. Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260.
Thursday, February 11, 2010
College may have violated the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act, Court of Appeals rules
The Second District Court of Appeals held last week that there was enough evidence to proceed against a college for a violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act, but not for breach of contract or fraud.
That case involved two former college students who were not granted degrees based on the fact that neither of them successfully completed externships at the end of their programs. However, the students successfully argued that the College had not provided the full surgical technology program during their regular term of
enrollment. Moreover, the College made the students wait a number of months after they had completed the "academic" portion of their program before providing them externships despite the fact that the college had represented to incoming students that it would provide them with a course of study culminating in a required externship during the final term.
The Court found that, as viewed from the perspective of the students, this could amount to a violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act, as it could be unfair and deceptive. In so doing, the Court reiterated its previous precedent that requiring a consumer to wait for performance under a contract could amount to a violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act.
That case involved two former college students who were not granted degrees based on the fact that neither of them successfully completed externships at the end of their programs. However, the students successfully argued that the College had not provided the full surgical technology program during their regular term of
enrollment. Moreover, the College made the students wait a number of months after they had completed the "academic" portion of their program before providing them externships despite the fact that the college had represented to incoming students that it would provide them with a course of study culminating in a required externship during the final term.
The Court found that, as viewed from the perspective of the students, this could amount to a violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act, as it could be unfair and deceptive. In so doing, the Court reiterated its previous precedent that requiring a consumer to wait for performance under a contract could amount to a violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act.
Wednesday, February 3, 2010
Supreme Court rejects "public duty" defense for public employees
In a 6-1 opinion last week, the Supreme Court ruled that the “public duty rule” does not immunize employees of a political subdivision from personal liability for injuries they cause in the performance of their official duties in cases where the injured party alleges that the employee engaged in “wanton or reckless conduct.”
In that case, the estate of the a woman killed by a drunk driver brought a lawsuit against police officers employed by a city. The suit alleged that the police officers allowed the drunk driver, who had been arrested the day before, to improperly obtain his vehicle. After improperly obtaining his vehicle, the day after his arrest, the drunk driver killed the woman in a head-on collission. Her estate alleged that the police officers acted wantonly and recklessly in allowing the drunk driver to obtain his vehicle the day after his arrest. The police officers alleged that the common law "public duty doctrine" applied. That doctrine provides immunity from civil liability in cases where a public employee causes injury to a third party through the breach of a “public duty,” i.e., by failing to perform a general duty owed to the public as a whole, as opposed to an individualized duty owed to the specific person seeking damages.
The Supreme Court refused to apply the "public duty" doctrine to the matter.
The relevance to educators is that despite the public duty doctrine, they may still be held liable for actions that are deemed to be "wanton or reckless."
In that case, the estate of the a woman killed by a drunk driver brought a lawsuit against police officers employed by a city. The suit alleged that the police officers allowed the drunk driver, who had been arrested the day before, to improperly obtain his vehicle. After improperly obtaining his vehicle, the day after his arrest, the drunk driver killed the woman in a head-on collission. Her estate alleged that the police officers acted wantonly and recklessly in allowing the drunk driver to obtain his vehicle the day after his arrest. The police officers alleged that the common law "public duty doctrine" applied. That doctrine provides immunity from civil liability in cases where a public employee causes injury to a third party through the breach of a “public duty,” i.e., by failing to perform a general duty owed to the public as a whole, as opposed to an individualized duty owed to the specific person seeking damages.
The Supreme Court refused to apply the "public duty" doctrine to the matter.
The relevance to educators is that despite the public duty doctrine, they may still be held liable for actions that are deemed to be "wanton or reckless."
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