The U.S. Supreme Court ruled today that a law school's non-discrimination policy does not run afoul of the U.S. Constitution by requiring all groups that are recognized and funded by a university to sign a pledge of non-discrimination.
The case before the court came as the result of a dispute between the University of California, Hastings and the Christian Legal Society. The university had a policy that all student groups had to be open to all individuals. Moreover, the university required all groups to sign a pledge that they would not discriminate based on, among others, religion and sexual orientation. The Christian Legal Society refused to sign the pledge and filed suit, alleging, among other things, a violation of their First Amendment rights of self-expression.
All lower courts that had considered the matter had sided with the university. The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the lower courts.
Monday, June 28, 2010
Thursday, June 3, 2010
Teacher reinstated, but board of education does not have to pay attorney fees, appeals court rules
The First District Court of Appeals today affirmed a decision by a trial court to reinstate a teacher who was terminated by his board of education under R.C. 3319.16 for "good and just cause" for alleging throwing a basketball at a student. That court, however, also found that the teacher was not entitled to attorney fees because his district did not act in bad faith.
The case involved a physical education/health teacher who had 20 years experience. Throughout his tenure, he had received positive reviews and had eight consecutive years of perfect attendance. In his evaluations, the teacher was specifically complimented on his (1) "strong discipline"; (2) his "professional manner"; (3) having "full control of * * * his classes"; (4) his "classroom management"; (5) his "professional manner structure and organization"; (6) the fact that "safety is stressed in both health and PE"; (7) being a "good role model"; and (8) being a "true professional who is a great role model for the students."
In June 2007, a male student athlete who stood six feet seven inches left the teacher's class without permission and began "shooting hoops" in the gymnasium. The teacher found the student and instructed him to go to the locker room to change clothes and then to attend his next class. The teacher had to instruct this student three times before the student complied. The student changed in the locker room, but instead of going to his next class, he went back to the gym to play basketball. The teacher again instructed the student, at least five or six times, not to shoot the basketball and to leave the court. When the student refused to comply with the instructions, the teacher, "with a two-hand push" of his own basketball, knocked the basketball the student was holding out of the student's hands in an effort to get him to leave the court. The student was angry and approached the teacher, but another teacher escorted the student from the gymnasium. The student was not injured.
Although the student claimed that he had been hit in the stomach, another student who had witnessed the incident stated that the ball that the teacher had thrown hit the basketball in the student's hands. The teacher was suspended indefinitely without pay.
The male student's mother initiated criminal proceedings against the teacher. The state charged him with assault, but he was acquitted following the presentation of the state's case due to the failure to prove that he had knowingly caused or attempted to cause physical harm to the student. The student had testified that the teacher had not thrown the ball "very hard" at him and that he had not believed that the teacher intended to harm him. He further testified that he had not been injured.
As a result of this incident, the Board initiated termination proceedings against the teacher. After hearing evidence, a referee determined that the teacher had not intended to throw a basketball at the student and that there was a difference between throwing a ball at a student and throwing a ball at an object the student was holding. The referee recommended reinstatement.
The Board of Education, however, terminated the teacher's contract, not agreeing with the referee's distinction between throwing a ball at a student and throwing a ball at an object a student was holding. The teacher appealed to the Court of Common Pleas, who agreed with the referee, that the incident was not a "fairly serious matter." The Court also awarded the teacher all of his attorney fees.
The Board of Education appealed. The Court of Appeals agreed that the incident was not a "fairly serious matter" but disagreed with the trial court that the board acted in bad faith. Thus, it upheld the teacher's reinstatement, but denied his attorney fees.
The case is Stalder v. St. Bernard-Elmwood Place City School District, 2010-Ohio-2363.
The case involved a physical education/health teacher who had 20 years experience. Throughout his tenure, he had received positive reviews and had eight consecutive years of perfect attendance. In his evaluations, the teacher was specifically complimented on his (1) "strong discipline"; (2) his "professional manner"; (3) having "full control of * * * his classes"; (4) his "classroom management"; (5) his "professional manner structure and organization"; (6) the fact that "safety is stressed in both health and PE"; (7) being a "good role model"; and (8) being a "true professional who is a great role model for the students."
In June 2007, a male student athlete who stood six feet seven inches left the teacher's class without permission and began "shooting hoops" in the gymnasium. The teacher found the student and instructed him to go to the locker room to change clothes and then to attend his next class. The teacher had to instruct this student three times before the student complied. The student changed in the locker room, but instead of going to his next class, he went back to the gym to play basketball. The teacher again instructed the student, at least five or six times, not to shoot the basketball and to leave the court. When the student refused to comply with the instructions, the teacher, "with a two-hand push" of his own basketball, knocked the basketball the student was holding out of the student's hands in an effort to get him to leave the court. The student was angry and approached the teacher, but another teacher escorted the student from the gymnasium. The student was not injured.
Although the student claimed that he had been hit in the stomach, another student who had witnessed the incident stated that the ball that the teacher had thrown hit the basketball in the student's hands. The teacher was suspended indefinitely without pay.
The male student's mother initiated criminal proceedings against the teacher. The state charged him with assault, but he was acquitted following the presentation of the state's case due to the failure to prove that he had knowingly caused or attempted to cause physical harm to the student. The student had testified that the teacher had not thrown the ball "very hard" at him and that he had not believed that the teacher intended to harm him. He further testified that he had not been injured.
As a result of this incident, the Board initiated termination proceedings against the teacher. After hearing evidence, a referee determined that the teacher had not intended to throw a basketball at the student and that there was a difference between throwing a ball at a student and throwing a ball at an object the student was holding. The referee recommended reinstatement.
The Board of Education, however, terminated the teacher's contract, not agreeing with the referee's distinction between throwing a ball at a student and throwing a ball at an object a student was holding. The teacher appealed to the Court of Common Pleas, who agreed with the referee, that the incident was not a "fairly serious matter." The Court also awarded the teacher all of his attorney fees.
The Board of Education appealed. The Court of Appeals agreed that the incident was not a "fairly serious matter" but disagreed with the trial court that the board acted in bad faith. Thus, it upheld the teacher's reinstatement, but denied his attorney fees.
The case is Stalder v. St. Bernard-Elmwood Place City School District, 2010-Ohio-2363.
Tuesday, May 11, 2010
Appeals Court Upholds Grant of Unemployment to Special Education Teacher
The Ninth District Court of Appeals has upheld the decision of a trial court finding that a special education teacher was terminated without just cause.
In that case, the special education teacher was discharged by her board of education for allegedly abusing a student in her care. She was initially denied unemployment benefits, after there was a finding that she was discharged for just cause. However, the teacher continued her appeals, and the decision was subsequently reversed by the review commission.
The review commission's decision was appealed to the Court of Common Pleas, which upheld the decision of the review commission. That decision was affirmed by the Ninth District. In reaching its decision that the trial court's decision was not unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the evidence, the appeals court relied on the facts that a county children services did not reveal bruising on the child's wrist or neck. Also, the children services’ final determination was that the claim of abuse was unsubstantiated and the Center for the Teaching Profession after conducting an investigation determined there was no abuse and renewed the appellee individual's teaching certificate. Furthermore, the state Department of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities did not place the appellee individual on its registry of those who had abused students.
Accordingly, the teacher was able to collect her unemployment benefits.
In that case, the special education teacher was discharged by her board of education for allegedly abusing a student in her care. She was initially denied unemployment benefits, after there was a finding that she was discharged for just cause. However, the teacher continued her appeals, and the decision was subsequently reversed by the review commission.
The review commission's decision was appealed to the Court of Common Pleas, which upheld the decision of the review commission. That decision was affirmed by the Ninth District. In reaching its decision that the trial court's decision was not unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the evidence, the appeals court relied on the facts that a county children services did not reveal bruising on the child's wrist or neck. Also, the children services’ final determination was that the claim of abuse was unsubstantiated and the Center for the Teaching Profession after conducting an investigation determined there was no abuse and renewed the appellee individual's teaching certificate. Furthermore, the state Department of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities did not place the appellee individual on its registry of those who had abused students.
Accordingly, the teacher was able to collect her unemployment benefits.
Thursday, May 6, 2010
Supreme Court of Ohio sets oral arguments in school background check case
The Supreme Court of Ohio has set oral arguments for June 8, 2010 in a dispute over the constitutionality of a law requiring the termination of all school employees with certain convictions.
In that case, the plaintiff was terminated his contract from his position of 11 years with the Cincinnati Public Schools after it was found out that he had been convicted of selling narcotics in 1976. The conviction had been expunged from his record and the plaintiff had been rehabilitated and not committed any other crimes.
The lawsuit alleges violations of both state and federal law. The federal court asked the Supreme Court of Ohio to clarify whether the statute violated two provisions of the Ohio Constitution, namely, (1) whether the statute was impermissibly retroactive under Article II, Section 28 and (2) whether the statute violated the Contracts Clause of the Ohio Constitution.
After the Supreme Court makes its determination, the lawsuit will likely be sent back to the federal court for determination of the federal issues.
In that case, the plaintiff was terminated his contract from his position of 11 years with the Cincinnati Public Schools after it was found out that he had been convicted of selling narcotics in 1976. The conviction had been expunged from his record and the plaintiff had been rehabilitated and not committed any other crimes.
The lawsuit alleges violations of both state and federal law. The federal court asked the Supreme Court of Ohio to clarify whether the statute violated two provisions of the Ohio Constitution, namely, (1) whether the statute was impermissibly retroactive under Article II, Section 28 and (2) whether the statute violated the Contracts Clause of the Ohio Constitution.
After the Supreme Court makes its determination, the lawsuit will likely be sent back to the federal court for determination of the federal issues.
Thursday, April 8, 2010
Immunity applies when office holder is sued in his official capacity
The Supreme Court of Ohio today ruled, 6-1, that public officeholders, sued in their official capacity, are immune from liability pursuant to R.C. 2774.02, (political subdivision immunity analysis) rather than the “political subdivision employee” immunity standards set forth in R.C. 2744.03(A)(6).
In that case, the plaintiff sued the Hamilton County Clerk of Courts for publishing her private information online after receiving a traffic citation.
The First District Court of Appeals found that political subdivision employee analysis applied. However, the Supreme Court found that political subdivision analysis applied and that the Clerk of Courts was immune from such suit because it occurred in his official capacity.
The same analysis would be applicable to school board members when sued in their official capacity.
In that case, the plaintiff sued the Hamilton County Clerk of Courts for publishing her private information online after receiving a traffic citation.
The First District Court of Appeals found that political subdivision employee analysis applied. However, the Supreme Court found that political subdivision analysis applied and that the Clerk of Courts was immune from such suit because it occurred in his official capacity.
The same analysis would be applicable to school board members when sued in their official capacity.
Tuesday, April 6, 2010
College of Medicine did not breach contract with student, appeals court rules
Case Western Reserve University did not breach its contract with a student when the school dismissed him from its medical school, the Eighth District Court of Appeals ruled last week.
In that case, the medical student was put on leave after failing four exams during his second year of medical school. He was also required to complete a program focusing on interpersonal communications skills and counseling. After completion of the program, the student would be considered for restarting his second year.
The student went on to repeat his second year at the medical school. However, he was referred to the Committee on Students in Spring 2005 after a faculty member wrote a letter complaining about his behavior in the faculty member's lab (2) an incident that had occurred earlier in his career in which a female student complained that he was harassing her and (3) the student's failure to remediate a failed exam. The Committee required the student to remediate the exam and submit a "fitness for duty" examination.
The fitness for duty exam concluded that the student had a personality disorder and had an inability to perceive or admit to his own mistakes. The report noted that the student believed himself to be superior, was unable to self-evaluate and self-criticize, and is interpersonally exploitative and lacks sympathy. The examiner viewed those traits as a "concern to anyone training a medical student."
Thereafter, the committee reviewed this and other information and decided to dismiss the medical student. He appealed his dismissal, though the committee's decision was ultimately upheld. A Dean of the medical school gave the student the option to withdraw before the letter dismissing him was issued. The student submitted a letter to the Dean withdrawing him, though he could not recall whether he was told that his record would reflect that he withdrew in lieu of dismissal.
The student then filed suit. He claimed that (1) Case was required to provide him with written notice of the grounds upon which the school intended to dismiss him, and with a hearing at which he could be present (2) there are material facts as to whether Case complied with its own contractual procedures in dismissing him.
As to these grounds, the court found that Case, as a private institution, owed no constitutional right of due process. Additionally, the court found that though there was custom to allow the student to be present during the Committee hearing, the custom did not rise to the leval of a contractual obligation.
Furthermore, the student requested declaratory judgment prohibiting the school from placing a notation on his file that he "withdrew in lieu of dismissal." The Court upheld the trial court's refusal to issue a declaratory judgment prohibiting such a notation on the file.
In that case, the medical student was put on leave after failing four exams during his second year of medical school. He was also required to complete a program focusing on interpersonal communications skills and counseling. After completion of the program, the student would be considered for restarting his second year.
The student went on to repeat his second year at the medical school. However, he was referred to the Committee on Students in Spring 2005 after a faculty member wrote a letter complaining about his behavior in the faculty member's lab (2) an incident that had occurred earlier in his career in which a female student complained that he was harassing her and (3) the student's failure to remediate a failed exam. The Committee required the student to remediate the exam and submit a "fitness for duty" examination.
The fitness for duty exam concluded that the student had a personality disorder and had an inability to perceive or admit to his own mistakes. The report noted that the student believed himself to be superior, was unable to self-evaluate and self-criticize, and is interpersonally exploitative and lacks sympathy. The examiner viewed those traits as a "concern to anyone training a medical student."
Thereafter, the committee reviewed this and other information and decided to dismiss the medical student. He appealed his dismissal, though the committee's decision was ultimately upheld. A Dean of the medical school gave the student the option to withdraw before the letter dismissing him was issued. The student submitted a letter to the Dean withdrawing him, though he could not recall whether he was told that his record would reflect that he withdrew in lieu of dismissal.
The student then filed suit. He claimed that (1) Case was required to provide him with written notice of the grounds upon which the school intended to dismiss him, and with a hearing at which he could be present (2) there are material facts as to whether Case complied with its own contractual procedures in dismissing him.
As to these grounds, the court found that Case, as a private institution, owed no constitutional right of due process. Additionally, the court found that though there was custom to allow the student to be present during the Committee hearing, the custom did not rise to the leval of a contractual obligation.
Furthermore, the student requested declaratory judgment prohibiting the school from placing a notation on his file that he "withdrew in lieu of dismissal." The Court upheld the trial court's refusal to issue a declaratory judgment prohibiting such a notation on the file.
Monday, April 5, 2010
Public school may be liable if employees were reckless, says appeals court
A school district may be liable if its public employees acted recklessly, the 9th district appeals court ruled last week in E.F. v. Oberlin City School District. At the same time, the court ruled that, as to the facts of that particular case, the school district was not liable under other theories of liability.
In that case, E.F., a child with Down syndrome, filed a complaint against the school district, the board of education, and certain employees of the school district after she was purportedly sexually assaulted on school grounds by two boys. The amended
complaint contained counts alleging negligence and recklessness; violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Act; violations of R.C. Chapter 3323; as well as intentional infliction of emotional distress. It also stated that the sexual assault occurred as the result of "extreme lack of teacher oversight."
The defendants sought judgment on the pleadings, requesting that the court find in their favor without a trial. After the plaintiffs answered, the trial court granted the defendants' motion, finding no liability on any of the defendants. The plaintiffs then appealled.
The appeals court agreed with the trial court's findings, except that the Court believed that E.F's cause of action alleging employee recklessness should be able to go forward. Indeed, the amended complaint stated (1) that E.F. was sexually assaulted under circumstances where there was a “recklessness and an extreme
lack of teacher oversight relating to the facts of these incidents," (2) that a substitute teacher was responsible for monitoring the classroom at the time of multiple incidents where E.F. was assaulted (3) that the school was aware that one of the students who attacked E.F. had “a history of *** psychological issues relating to abuse and assault," (4) that “Oberlin Schools recklessly placed these students into a class with mentally handicapped students, such as E.F, with full knowledge of such student’s (sic) propensity to abuse the disabled students in the classroom," (5) that “Defendants also acted recklessly in the monitoring of classrooms which E.F was in” and further that “[a]ll regular teachers and substitute teachers acted recklessly in monitoring the children of his/her classroom by failing to even notice when students disappeared from the classroom.” The complaint also states that the recklessness of teachers “resulted in E.F. being sexually assaulted by the [s]tudents.”
The reversal by the appeals court does not mean that the school district is in fact liable, but rather that the Plaintiffs should have an opportunity to attempt to prove that the school district is liable because its employees acted recklessly.
In that case, E.F., a child with Down syndrome, filed a complaint against the school district, the board of education, and certain employees of the school district after she was purportedly sexually assaulted on school grounds by two boys. The amended
complaint contained counts alleging negligence and recklessness; violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Act; violations of R.C. Chapter 3323; as well as intentional infliction of emotional distress. It also stated that the sexual assault occurred as the result of "extreme lack of teacher oversight."
The defendants sought judgment on the pleadings, requesting that the court find in their favor without a trial. After the plaintiffs answered, the trial court granted the defendants' motion, finding no liability on any of the defendants. The plaintiffs then appealled.
The appeals court agreed with the trial court's findings, except that the Court believed that E.F's cause of action alleging employee recklessness should be able to go forward. Indeed, the amended complaint stated (1) that E.F. was sexually assaulted under circumstances where there was a “recklessness and an extreme
lack of teacher oversight relating to the facts of these incidents," (2) that a substitute teacher was responsible for monitoring the classroom at the time of multiple incidents where E.F. was assaulted (3) that the school was aware that one of the students who attacked E.F. had “a history of *** psychological issues relating to abuse and assault," (4) that “Oberlin Schools recklessly placed these students into a class with mentally handicapped students, such as E.F, with full knowledge of such student’s (sic) propensity to abuse the disabled students in the classroom," (5) that “Defendants also acted recklessly in the monitoring of classrooms which E.F was in” and further that “[a]ll regular teachers and substitute teachers acted recklessly in monitoring the children of his/her classroom by failing to even notice when students disappeared from the classroom.” The complaint also states that the recklessness of teachers “resulted in E.F. being sexually assaulted by the [s]tudents.”
The reversal by the appeals court does not mean that the school district is in fact liable, but rather that the Plaintiffs should have an opportunity to attempt to prove that the school district is liable because its employees acted recklessly.
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