The Ninth District Court of Appeals for Ohio sided today with a school district today in a public records dispute.
The case, State ex rel. Johnson v. Oberlin City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 2009-Ohio-3526, stems from a denial of a public records request to the Oberlin School District Board of Education. The bylaws and policies of the Oberlin City School District provide that each year, the school board must evaluate the Superintendent and provide teh Superintendent with a written copy of the evaluation. The board then relies upon the evaluation in determining whether or not to renew the Superintendent's contract.
This process requires individual board members to evaluate the Superintendent and then give their results on the Board President, who uses the evaluations to compile the Superintendent’s composite evaluation. In her public records request, Johnson requested the evaluations submitted by the individual members of the Board. Johnson’s request was denied on the basis that individual evaluations are not public records as defined by R.C. 149.43.
The court affirmed the decision of the trial court, finding that only the final evaluation is a public record under R.C. 149.43.
Monday, July 20, 2009
Monday, July 13, 2009
Court of Appeals upholds trial court's narrow interpretation of "salary" in R.C. 3319.12 for teacher with continuing contract
The Twelfth District Court of Appeals held today that a school board does not violate R.C. 3319.12 when it fails to pay a continuing contract teacher the entire amount her contract requires when that teacher does not work the amount of days required in the contract.
At issue in the case was Carla A. Varasso, an art teacher with a continuing contract. That contract required her to work 183 days of the year
for an annual salary of $56,422.16, or $308.32 per day. However, in May 2004, Ms. Varasso was severely injured in an accident that left her unable to teach again until Fall 2005. By the time she returned, she had missed 58 days of the school year, only nine of which had been covered by sick leave.
Thus, Ms. Varasso had her compensation reduced for the time that she was off of work without sick leave. She thus filed suit, alleging a violation of R.C. 3319.12 which prohibits reducing teacher's salaries from the amount that they made the year before, unless the reduction is part of a uniform plan adopted by the school district.
The 12th District found that "salary" meant "rate of pay" and as long as the teacher was paid the same rate of pay for the days she worked, there was no violation of the statute.
The case is Varasso v. Williamsburg Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 2009-Ohio-3419.
At issue in the case was Carla A. Varasso, an art teacher with a continuing contract. That contract required her to work 183 days of the year
for an annual salary of $56,422.16, or $308.32 per day. However, in May 2004, Ms. Varasso was severely injured in an accident that left her unable to teach again until Fall 2005. By the time she returned, she had missed 58 days of the school year, only nine of which had been covered by sick leave.
Thus, Ms. Varasso had her compensation reduced for the time that she was off of work without sick leave. She thus filed suit, alleging a violation of R.C. 3319.12 which prohibits reducing teacher's salaries from the amount that they made the year before, unless the reduction is part of a uniform plan adopted by the school district.
The 12th District found that "salary" meant "rate of pay" and as long as the teacher was paid the same rate of pay for the days she worked, there was no violation of the statute.
The case is Varasso v. Williamsburg Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 2009-Ohio-3419.
Thursday, June 25, 2009
Strip search violated student's rights, Court finds, but no administrator liability
A fractured Supreme Court found today that a student's constitutional right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure was violated when administrators strip searched her in search of ibuprofen, but that those administrators were not personally liable because the law was not "clearly established" at the time of the search.
The Court's opinion reiterated that the legal standard for student searches put forward by the Court in the TLO case still applies in public schools. That standard requires less than the probable cause normally required when the government conducts a search. However, school searches must be reasonable under the circumstances and proportional to the suspicion that gave rise to the search.
While the Court found that the search of the student's backpack and outer clothing was reasonable under the circumstances of this case, the Court held that the strip search went too far (the administrators made the girl partially remove her bra and required her to fan out her underwear). But because the law was not "clearly established" at the time of the search, the administrators were immune from liability.
This case is significant for a few reasons, one of them being that courts (and the Supreme Court) have increasingly deferred to judgment of school administrators in such matters, particularly where drugs are concerned, as was the case in Morse v. Frederick (that case, admittedly, was about speech and not intimate strip searches).
Parents, students, and administrators should take note of the facts in this case. While the law may not have been "clearly established" at the time of this particular search, this case will help to more clearly establish the factors in an unreasonable search where administrator liability may lie.
The Court's opinion reiterated that the legal standard for student searches put forward by the Court in the TLO case still applies in public schools. That standard requires less than the probable cause normally required when the government conducts a search. However, school searches must be reasonable under the circumstances and proportional to the suspicion that gave rise to the search.
While the Court found that the search of the student's backpack and outer clothing was reasonable under the circumstances of this case, the Court held that the strip search went too far (the administrators made the girl partially remove her bra and required her to fan out her underwear). But because the law was not "clearly established" at the time of the search, the administrators were immune from liability.
This case is significant for a few reasons, one of them being that courts (and the Supreme Court) have increasingly deferred to judgment of school administrators in such matters, particularly where drugs are concerned, as was the case in Morse v. Frederick (that case, admittedly, was about speech and not intimate strip searches).
Parents, students, and administrators should take note of the facts in this case. While the law may not have been "clearly established" at the time of this particular search, this case will help to more clearly establish the factors in an unreasonable search where administrator liability may lie.
Monday, June 22, 2009
U.S. Supreme Court confirms that school districts may be liable for reimbursement when they fail to provide a free appropriate education
The U.S. Supreme Court, in a 6-3 opinion released today, has made it easier for parents of special education students to be reimbursed for the cost of private schooling for their children.
The lawsuit had been brought by a teenage boy from Oregon whose parents sought the court to force the public school district in which he lived to pay the $5,200/month it cost to educate him at the private school.
At the center of the case was IDEA, the federal law that requires all States receiving federal funding to provide a "free appropriate public education" (FAPE) to all children with disabilities residing in the State. It was clear that when a public school fails to provide a FAPE, and a child’s parents place the child in an appropriate private school without the school district’s consent, a court may require the district to reimburse the parents for the cost of the private education. However, the question before the Court was whether 1997 amendments to IDEA barred an action for reimbursement for private-education costs if a child had not “previously received special education and related services under the authority of a public agency." The Court held that it was not necessary for the child to have previously received special education and related services by the School District to be reimbursed for those services.
In this case, the child, T.A., had been educated in the same district from kindergarten through his junior year in high school. From kindergarten through eighth grade, the student's teachers had observed that he had trouble paying attention in class and completing his assignments. When he entered high school, his difficulties increased. Nonetheless, the school district repeatedly concluded that the student did not qualify for special services related to any learning disability. His parents finally removed him from public school and requested reimbursement from the school district for his education.
A hearing officer found that the parents were entitled to reimbursement; the U.S. District Court reversed, finding that IDEA did not provide such a remedy. However, the 9th District Court of Appeals reversed the District Court, finding reimbursement an appropriate remedy. Today's decision affirms that reimbursement may be an appropriate remedy when a public school district fails to provide a FAPE, and enrolling the student in private school is appropriate.
The lawsuit had been brought by a teenage boy from Oregon whose parents sought the court to force the public school district in which he lived to pay the $5,200/month it cost to educate him at the private school.
At the center of the case was IDEA, the federal law that requires all States receiving federal funding to provide a "free appropriate public education" (FAPE) to all children with disabilities residing in the State. It was clear that when a public school fails to provide a FAPE, and a child’s parents place the child in an appropriate private school without the school district’s consent, a court may require the district to reimburse the parents for the cost of the private education. However, the question before the Court was whether 1997 amendments to IDEA barred an action for reimbursement for private-education costs if a child had not “previously received special education and related services under the authority of a public agency." The Court held that it was not necessary for the child to have previously received special education and related services by the School District to be reimbursed for those services.
In this case, the child, T.A., had been educated in the same district from kindergarten through his junior year in high school. From kindergarten through eighth grade, the student's teachers had observed that he had trouble paying attention in class and completing his assignments. When he entered high school, his difficulties increased. Nonetheless, the school district repeatedly concluded that the student did not qualify for special services related to any learning disability. His parents finally removed him from public school and requested reimbursement from the school district for his education.
A hearing officer found that the parents were entitled to reimbursement; the U.S. District Court reversed, finding that IDEA did not provide such a remedy. However, the 9th District Court of Appeals reversed the District Court, finding reimbursement an appropriate remedy. Today's decision affirms that reimbursement may be an appropriate remedy when a public school district fails to provide a FAPE, and enrolling the student in private school is appropriate.
Wednesday, June 17, 2009
State Board of Education considering new rules for school employees with convictions
The State Board of Education is debating a proposal that would give greater leeway to school districts to hire non-licensed personnel, such as custodians, secretaries, bus drivers, and cafeteria workers, who have nonviolent criminal convictions.
The proposal would allow districts to hire applicants (and keep current employees) who can show that they have been rehabilitated for a period of years. The proposal would not be a mandate; a school district could apply tougher standards than the state.
Generally, under the proposal, people convicted of non-violent felonies, would be required to show they have had a clean record for 20 years; drug offenders would have to stay clean for 10 years, and misdemeanor offenders would have to have a clean record for 5 years.
In addition to having no new criminal convictions, the non-licensed personnel would be required to provide the district with a statement from a court, parole officer, probation officer or counselor.
While good arguments exist on both sides, school districts should be given the opportunity to hire the most qualified, able-bodied applicants for the job, even if those applicants have a several years-old, relatively minor criminal conviction. Unless there is a good reason to exclude someone with a conviction from working in the schools (i.e. sexual conviction), first-time offenders should be given an opportunity at a second chance if they have been rehabilitated.
The proposal would allow districts to hire applicants (and keep current employees) who can show that they have been rehabilitated for a period of years. The proposal would not be a mandate; a school district could apply tougher standards than the state.
Generally, under the proposal, people convicted of non-violent felonies, would be required to show they have had a clean record for 20 years; drug offenders would have to stay clean for 10 years, and misdemeanor offenders would have to have a clean record for 5 years.
In addition to having no new criminal convictions, the non-licensed personnel would be required to provide the district with a statement from a court, parole officer, probation officer or counselor.
While good arguments exist on both sides, school districts should be given the opportunity to hire the most qualified, able-bodied applicants for the job, even if those applicants have a several years-old, relatively minor criminal conviction. Unless there is a good reason to exclude someone with a conviction from working in the schools (i.e. sexual conviction), first-time offenders should be given an opportunity at a second chance if they have been rehabilitated.
Tuesday, May 26, 2009
Federal appeals court upholds dismissal of case of parents whose autistic son wandered off school grounds, found nude
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which covers Ohio, last week upheld a District Court's dismissal of a case brought by the parents of an autistic child who had wandered off school grounds and was found sometime later, nude and covered in mud. The matter is
The case was brought by David and Linda Parker and on behalf of their non-verbal autistic son, A.P. against the school principal, the school gym teacher, and the teacher's aide assigned to watch A.P. during gym class. While in gym class, A.P. wandered out of his afternoon gym class through an open gym door and out into the surrounding neighborhood. Upon discovering A.P.’s absence, the aide notified school officials, who initiated a search. With the help of local police, A.P. was found
several hours later, naked and covered in mud, a number of blocks away from school. The appeals court found that there was no evidence that A.P. was harmed during his absence from school and no evidence as to why he was not clothed when found.
A.P.’s parents then filed a lawsuit, alleging that in allowing him to wander
out of gym class the defendants had violated his substantive due process right “to be secure at school.” After discovery, the district court dismissed the matter because A.P. could not show the deprivation of a constitutional right. The appellate court held that A.P. had a right to "bodily integrity" under the Constitution, there was no evidence that right had been denied because though dirty and unclothed, there was no evidence of trauma or injury, be it physical or psychological.
Had A.P. suffered a physical or mental trauma, I believe the Court might have come to a different conclusion. Luckily for the school officials here, the Court did not find an injury had occurred.
The case was brought by David and Linda Parker and on behalf of their non-verbal autistic son, A.P. against the school principal, the school gym teacher, and the teacher's aide assigned to watch A.P. during gym class. While in gym class, A.P. wandered out of his afternoon gym class through an open gym door and out into the surrounding neighborhood. Upon discovering A.P.’s absence, the aide notified school officials, who initiated a search. With the help of local police, A.P. was found
several hours later, naked and covered in mud, a number of blocks away from school. The appeals court found that there was no evidence that A.P. was harmed during his absence from school and no evidence as to why he was not clothed when found.
A.P.’s parents then filed a lawsuit, alleging that in allowing him to wander
out of gym class the defendants had violated his substantive due process right “to be secure at school.” After discovery, the district court dismissed the matter because A.P. could not show the deprivation of a constitutional right. The appellate court held that A.P. had a right to "bodily integrity" under the Constitution, there was no evidence that right had been denied because though dirty and unclothed, there was no evidence of trauma or injury, be it physical or psychological.
Had A.P. suffered a physical or mental trauma, I believe the Court might have come to a different conclusion. Luckily for the school officials here, the Court did not find an injury had occurred.
Thursday, May 21, 2009
11th District Court of Appeals holds that board of education can be compelled to provide transportation for students
The Eleventh District Court of Appeals, in State ex rel. Luchette v. Pasquerilla, found that a court of common pleas may order a school district to provide transportation to a student when the Ohio State Board of Education has found that it is not impractical to do so.
The case involved a mother and her child who live in the Brookfield School District, but the child attends a a nonpublic school. In 2006, the Brookfield School District Board of Education passed a resolution, pursuant to R.C. 3327.02(A) and (B)(1), finding that transportation of the child was impractical. Under R.C. 3327.02(A)(3), the Trumbull County Educational Service Center review the decision and agreed with the school district, permitting the district to offer payment in lieu of transportation. The parents rejected payment and requested mediation by the Ohio Department of Education, as permitted by R.C. 3327.02(E)(1)(a). When mediation did not reach a resolution, a hearing was held, as required by R.C. 3327.02(E)(1)(b).
As a result of the hearing, the hearing officer recommended, and the state board approved, declining confirmation of the school district's impracticality decision. The recommendation found that the district only considered two of the six statutory factors in making its determination, among other findings. No one appealed the decision under R.C. 119.12. Nonetheless, the district refused to provide transportation.
The student sought an order from the Court of Common Pleas compelling the board to provide transportation. The Court of Common Pleas dismissed the case, finding the case improperly brought.
The Court of Appeals, however, ordered the school district to provide transportation and reversed and remanded the trial court's decision.
The case involved a mother and her child who live in the Brookfield School District, but the child attends a a nonpublic school. In 2006, the Brookfield School District Board of Education passed a resolution, pursuant to R.C. 3327.02(A) and (B)(1), finding that transportation of the child was impractical. Under R.C. 3327.02(A)(3), the Trumbull County Educational Service Center review the decision and agreed with the school district, permitting the district to offer payment in lieu of transportation. The parents rejected payment and requested mediation by the Ohio Department of Education, as permitted by R.C. 3327.02(E)(1)(a). When mediation did not reach a resolution, a hearing was held, as required by R.C. 3327.02(E)(1)(b).
As a result of the hearing, the hearing officer recommended, and the state board approved, declining confirmation of the school district's impracticality decision. The recommendation found that the district only considered two of the six statutory factors in making its determination, among other findings. No one appealed the decision under R.C. 119.12. Nonetheless, the district refused to provide transportation.
The student sought an order from the Court of Common Pleas compelling the board to provide transportation. The Court of Common Pleas dismissed the case, finding the case improperly brought.
The Court of Appeals, however, ordered the school district to provide transportation and reversed and remanded the trial court's decision.
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