The Marysville School District has, at least temporarily, banned PG-13 and R rated movies from the school's curriculum. The ban is the result of complaints by parents that such films contain too mature of a content for high school students. Thus, historical films like "Schindler's List" and "Saving Private Ryan" will now be off limits to students within that district.
Generally, courts uphold the right of boards of education to make decisions like which course materials to use against the constitutional claims of students and teachers alike. However, the case may be different if these materials are held in the library where students may access them, and are being removed "simply because they dislike the ideas contained in those books and seek by their removal to 'prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, and other matters of opinion.'"
However, showing the films in a classroom (as opposed to private student viewing) may be more likely to bear the school's 'imprimatur' and probably can, consistent with the First Amendment, be banned pursuant to school board policy. See e.g. Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260.
Wednesday, February 24, 2010
Thursday, February 11, 2010
College may have violated the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act, Court of Appeals rules
The Second District Court of Appeals held last week that there was enough evidence to proceed against a college for a violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act, but not for breach of contract or fraud.
That case involved two former college students who were not granted degrees based on the fact that neither of them successfully completed externships at the end of their programs. However, the students successfully argued that the College had not provided the full surgical technology program during their regular term of
enrollment. Moreover, the College made the students wait a number of months after they had completed the "academic" portion of their program before providing them externships despite the fact that the college had represented to incoming students that it would provide them with a course of study culminating in a required externship during the final term.
The Court found that, as viewed from the perspective of the students, this could amount to a violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act, as it could be unfair and deceptive. In so doing, the Court reiterated its previous precedent that requiring a consumer to wait for performance under a contract could amount to a violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act.
That case involved two former college students who were not granted degrees based on the fact that neither of them successfully completed externships at the end of their programs. However, the students successfully argued that the College had not provided the full surgical technology program during their regular term of
enrollment. Moreover, the College made the students wait a number of months after they had completed the "academic" portion of their program before providing them externships despite the fact that the college had represented to incoming students that it would provide them with a course of study culminating in a required externship during the final term.
The Court found that, as viewed from the perspective of the students, this could amount to a violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act, as it could be unfair and deceptive. In so doing, the Court reiterated its previous precedent that requiring a consumer to wait for performance under a contract could amount to a violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act.
Wednesday, February 3, 2010
Supreme Court rejects "public duty" defense for public employees
In a 6-1 opinion last week, the Supreme Court ruled that the “public duty rule” does not immunize employees of a political subdivision from personal liability for injuries they cause in the performance of their official duties in cases where the injured party alleges that the employee engaged in “wanton or reckless conduct.”
In that case, the estate of the a woman killed by a drunk driver brought a lawsuit against police officers employed by a city. The suit alleged that the police officers allowed the drunk driver, who had been arrested the day before, to improperly obtain his vehicle. After improperly obtaining his vehicle, the day after his arrest, the drunk driver killed the woman in a head-on collission. Her estate alleged that the police officers acted wantonly and recklessly in allowing the drunk driver to obtain his vehicle the day after his arrest. The police officers alleged that the common law "public duty doctrine" applied. That doctrine provides immunity from civil liability in cases where a public employee causes injury to a third party through the breach of a “public duty,” i.e., by failing to perform a general duty owed to the public as a whole, as opposed to an individualized duty owed to the specific person seeking damages.
The Supreme Court refused to apply the "public duty" doctrine to the matter.
The relevance to educators is that despite the public duty doctrine, they may still be held liable for actions that are deemed to be "wanton or reckless."
In that case, the estate of the a woman killed by a drunk driver brought a lawsuit against police officers employed by a city. The suit alleged that the police officers allowed the drunk driver, who had been arrested the day before, to improperly obtain his vehicle. After improperly obtaining his vehicle, the day after his arrest, the drunk driver killed the woman in a head-on collission. Her estate alleged that the police officers acted wantonly and recklessly in allowing the drunk driver to obtain his vehicle the day after his arrest. The police officers alleged that the common law "public duty doctrine" applied. That doctrine provides immunity from civil liability in cases where a public employee causes injury to a third party through the breach of a “public duty,” i.e., by failing to perform a general duty owed to the public as a whole, as opposed to an individualized duty owed to the specific person seeking damages.
The Supreme Court refused to apply the "public duty" doctrine to the matter.
The relevance to educators is that despite the public duty doctrine, they may still be held liable for actions that are deemed to be "wanton or reckless."
Tuesday, January 5, 2010
Teacher not entitled to continuing contract, appeals court rules
An Ohio appeals court upheld the dismissal of a teacher who claimed he had a legal right to a continuing contract in the case of State ex rel. Browne v. Sandusky School District Board of Education.
In that case, the teacher had graduated with a Bachelor of Fine Arts degree from Bowling Green State University. In the spring semester of 1983, he enrolled in and received three credit hours in the area of licensure or in an area related to the teaching field. In the spring semester of 1994, at Bowling Green State University, Mr. Browne enrolled in and received credit for 18 hours of coursework in the area of licensure or in an area related to the teaching field.
On June 20, 1994, the Ohio Department of Education issued appellant his
first four-year provisional teaching certificate; at that time, appellant did not hold a master's degree. From 1994 until present, Mr. Browne has been employed with the Sandusky City School District. Following the issuance of his initial teaching certificate through 2003, appellant completed ten hours of coursework in his area of licensure or in an area related to the teaching field.
Believing that he had attained eligibility for a continuing contract, Mr. Browne
applied for a continuing contract for the 2005-2006 school year. In November 2005,
Mr. Browne was informed that he needed to complete two additional semester hours in order to be eligible for continuing contract status. In 2006, Mr. Browne completed an additional three hours of coursework. Also in 2006, he was issued a five-year professional license by the Ohio Department of Education.
In November 2006, Mr. Browne again requested that the Board consider his
eligibility for a continuing contract. In a letter dated December 8, 2006, the Superintendent informed Mr. Browne that, upon closer inspection of
his transcripts, the semester hours that appellant completed following his baccalaureate degree but prior to his initial licensure did not count toward the 30 semester hour requirement for continuing contract purposes. The Superintendent then informed appellant that he needed to complete 20 additional semester hours to be eligible for continuing contract status.
Mr. Browne did not complete any additional semester hours but continued to
assert his right to a continuing contract. On September 18, 2007, the Board again denied his request for a continuing contract.
On July 15, 2008, he filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus
requesting that the Erie County Court of Common Pleas compel the Board to issue him a
continuing contract. Specifically, he asserted that, pursuant to R.C. 3319.11,
he had a clear legal right to a continuing contract; the Board was under a duty to
award him a continuing contract; and that he had no adequate remedy at law.
On the school board's motion, the trial court dismissed the case. The appeals court upheld the dismissal, finding that Ohio Revised Code 3319.08(B)(2)(a) requires that 30 semester hours, in their entirety, must be commenced and completed following the issuance of the initial teaching certificate. Mr. Browne had argued that teachers could commence taking the hours beforehand. The lesson to teachers is that if they want their semester hours to count towards continuing contracts, they should only begin such coursework upon the initial issuance of their licensure.
In that case, the teacher had graduated with a Bachelor of Fine Arts degree from Bowling Green State University. In the spring semester of 1983, he enrolled in and received three credit hours in the area of licensure or in an area related to the teaching field. In the spring semester of 1994, at Bowling Green State University, Mr. Browne enrolled in and received credit for 18 hours of coursework in the area of licensure or in an area related to the teaching field.
On June 20, 1994, the Ohio Department of Education issued appellant his
first four-year provisional teaching certificate; at that time, appellant did not hold a master's degree. From 1994 until present, Mr. Browne has been employed with the Sandusky City School District. Following the issuance of his initial teaching certificate through 2003, appellant completed ten hours of coursework in his area of licensure or in an area related to the teaching field.
Believing that he had attained eligibility for a continuing contract, Mr. Browne
applied for a continuing contract for the 2005-2006 school year. In November 2005,
Mr. Browne was informed that he needed to complete two additional semester hours in order to be eligible for continuing contract status. In 2006, Mr. Browne completed an additional three hours of coursework. Also in 2006, he was issued a five-year professional license by the Ohio Department of Education.
In November 2006, Mr. Browne again requested that the Board consider his
eligibility for a continuing contract. In a letter dated December 8, 2006, the Superintendent informed Mr. Browne that, upon closer inspection of
his transcripts, the semester hours that appellant completed following his baccalaureate degree but prior to his initial licensure did not count toward the 30 semester hour requirement for continuing contract purposes. The Superintendent then informed appellant that he needed to complete 20 additional semester hours to be eligible for continuing contract status.
Mr. Browne did not complete any additional semester hours but continued to
assert his right to a continuing contract. On September 18, 2007, the Board again denied his request for a continuing contract.
On July 15, 2008, he filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus
requesting that the Erie County Court of Common Pleas compel the Board to issue him a
continuing contract. Specifically, he asserted that, pursuant to R.C. 3319.11,
he had a clear legal right to a continuing contract; the Board was under a duty to
award him a continuing contract; and that he had no adequate remedy at law.
On the school board's motion, the trial court dismissed the case. The appeals court upheld the dismissal, finding that Ohio Revised Code 3319.08(B)(2)(a) requires that 30 semester hours, in their entirety, must be commenced and completed following the issuance of the initial teaching certificate. Mr. Browne had argued that teachers could commence taking the hours beforehand. The lesson to teachers is that if they want their semester hours to count towards continuing contracts, they should only begin such coursework upon the initial issuance of their licensure.
Tuesday, December 8, 2009
Supreme Court accepts case that pits university, Christian group over admission of gay students
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed yesterday to decide whether a state-funded university violates the United States Constitution by requiring student groups to be open to all.
The lawsuit was filed by the Christian Legal Society after the student group refused to admit gay and lesbian students at the University of California at Hastings School of Law. The law school, citing a policy that all student groups have to be open to all students, said that the group would lose its status as an official student group. The group also forbids membership to others not following its biblical interpretation.
Although the dispute arose in the law school context, the decision could have much further reaching implications.
Similar disputes have been going on across the country for the last decade. The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law faced a similar dispute in Fall 2003. Rather than wait for a court ruling, the administration voluntarily changed its policy to exempt religious organizations from the rules that require groups to be open to all students.
The appeal from the Supreme Court was from a decision upholding the actions of the law school.
Stay tuned.
The lawsuit was filed by the Christian Legal Society after the student group refused to admit gay and lesbian students at the University of California at Hastings School of Law. The law school, citing a policy that all student groups have to be open to all students, said that the group would lose its status as an official student group. The group also forbids membership to others not following its biblical interpretation.
Although the dispute arose in the law school context, the decision could have much further reaching implications.
Similar disputes have been going on across the country for the last decade. The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law faced a similar dispute in Fall 2003. Rather than wait for a court ruling, the administration voluntarily changed its policy to exempt religious organizations from the rules that require groups to be open to all students.
The appeal from the Supreme Court was from a decision upholding the actions of the law school.
Stay tuned.
Tuesday, November 17, 2009
U.S. Supreme Court rejects two school law appeals
In two separate cases, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear appeals dealing with constitutional school law questions.
The first case involved an appeal from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals from Henderson, Nevada. In that case, high school officials turned off the student's microphone during her graduation speech because it was religion-tinged. The justices denial of the case means that the appeals court opinion, with no liability on the part of the school officials, stands.
The second case involved an appeal from the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals. In that case, the ACLU of Florida had sought review of a school board's decision to remove the book "A Visit to Cuba." Parents of school children, as well as the ACLU, sued the district, alleging violations of the First Amendment. The District Court granted the parent's request. However, the court of appeals found that the school board had not acted because it disliked the ideas in the book, but because the book contained factual inaccuracies, something a school board is allowed to act on. The ACLU requested the Supreme Court reviewed the decision; however, the Supreme Court allowed the decision of the 11th Circuit to stand.
The first case involved an appeal from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals from Henderson, Nevada. In that case, high school officials turned off the student's microphone during her graduation speech because it was religion-tinged. The justices denial of the case means that the appeals court opinion, with no liability on the part of the school officials, stands.
The second case involved an appeal from the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals. In that case, the ACLU of Florida had sought review of a school board's decision to remove the book "A Visit to Cuba." Parents of school children, as well as the ACLU, sued the district, alleging violations of the First Amendment. The District Court granted the parent's request. However, the court of appeals found that the school board had not acted because it disliked the ideas in the book, but because the book contained factual inaccuracies, something a school board is allowed to act on. The ACLU requested the Supreme Court reviewed the decision; however, the Supreme Court allowed the decision of the 11th Circuit to stand.
Thursday, November 12, 2009
Federal Appeals Court sides with school board in First Amendment dispute
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit this morning sided with a school board in a dispute between parents of student football players on one side and the school district and football coach on the other.
In Lowery v. Jefferson County Board of Education, the high school football coach dismissed the plaintiffs' children from the team for questioning his leadership. The parents of the students made appeals to various school officials. Unsatisfied, the parents requested to speak to the board of education about the incident. In particular, one of the parents asked the board to speak at the next board meeting.
The Board of Education had a policy allowing individual members of the public to address the board for up five minutes so long as the address was not frivolous, harassing, or repetitive.
The Board granted the request of the parent. An attorney representing the parents addressed the board and apparently criticized Board staff and threatened legal action, among other things. The parents' request was still not granted.
Undeterred, the parents requested another meeting with the board of education. This time, the Board denied the request--finding it to be repetitive and harassing.
The parents sued, claiming that the district, acting under color of state law, deprived the students and the parents of their First Amendment rights by dismissing the students from the team and for refusing to allow the parents to speak at the second Board meeting.
The District Court found the Board not liable, and ordered the parents to pay the Board's attorney fees. The parents appealed.
The appellate court upheld the District Court, holding that the school board meeting was a limited public forum and that the Board's denial of the parent's opportunity to speak at second Board meeting was a time, place and manner
manner restriction that was content-neutral, narrowly tailored to serve a
significant governmental interest, left open ample alternative channels for
communication of the information.
The appeals court did, however, reverse the award of attorney fees to the Board, finding that this case did not warrant such an award.
In Lowery v. Jefferson County Board of Education, the high school football coach dismissed the plaintiffs' children from the team for questioning his leadership. The parents of the students made appeals to various school officials. Unsatisfied, the parents requested to speak to the board of education about the incident. In particular, one of the parents asked the board to speak at the next board meeting.
The Board of Education had a policy allowing individual members of the public to address the board for up five minutes so long as the address was not frivolous, harassing, or repetitive.
The Board granted the request of the parent. An attorney representing the parents addressed the board and apparently criticized Board staff and threatened legal action, among other things. The parents' request was still not granted.
Undeterred, the parents requested another meeting with the board of education. This time, the Board denied the request--finding it to be repetitive and harassing.
The parents sued, claiming that the district, acting under color of state law, deprived the students and the parents of their First Amendment rights by dismissing the students from the team and for refusing to allow the parents to speak at the second Board meeting.
The District Court found the Board not liable, and ordered the parents to pay the Board's attorney fees. The parents appealed.
The appellate court upheld the District Court, holding that the school board meeting was a limited public forum and that the Board's denial of the parent's opportunity to speak at second Board meeting was a time, place and manner
manner restriction that was content-neutral, narrowly tailored to serve a
significant governmental interest, left open ample alternative channels for
communication of the information.
The appeals court did, however, reverse the award of attorney fees to the Board, finding that this case did not warrant such an award.
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